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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF




The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, which defines the scope of
constitutional protection from governmental privacy intrusions in both the
United States and Canada, is notoriously indeterminate. This
indeterminacy stems in large measure from the tendency ofjudges to think
of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. This "moral" approach to privacy
is normatively questionable, and it does a poor job of identifying the
circumstances in which privacy should prevail over countervailing
interests, such as the deterrence of crime. In this Article, I develop an
alternative, economically-informed approach to the reasonable expectation
of privacy test. In contrast to the moral approach, which treats privacy as
a fundamental right, the economic approach views it as an (normatively
neutral) aspect of self-interest: the desire to conceal and control potentially
damaging personal information. According to this view, privacy should not
be protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence of
crime. In other cases, however, legal protections against governmental
surveillance may enhance social welfare by encouraging productive
transactions, diminishing the costs of non-legal privacy barriers, and
limiting suboptimal policing practices such as discriminatory profiling and
the enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public
choice theory can also help to minimize decision-making error by
predicting which legal actors-police, legislatures, or courts-are best
placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime control.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, LLM (Harvard), LLB
(Alberta), BA (Alberta). The author wishes to thank Norman Siebrasse for valuable
feedback and Patrick Young for excellent research assistance.
STEVEN PENNEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In both the United States and Canada, the reasonable expectation of
privacy test defines the scope of constitutional protection from
governmental privacy intrusions. When a court decides that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to an investigative technique,
there is no "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution' or § 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 In such cases, police are free (absent any
statutory restriction) to use the technique without first obtaining a warrant
or establishing individualized suspicion.3 When there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, in contrast, police must generally obtain a warrant
based on probable cause before conducting the search.4
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence that American and Canadian courts
have developed in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test is
notoriously circular, imprecise, and unpredictable.5 In this Article, I argue
that this indeterminacy stems in large measure from the tendency of judges
to think of privacy in non-instrumentalist terms. Courts typically view
privacy as a fundamental right, rooted in notions of dignity, autonomy,
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure." Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada Act, 1982,
sched. B, ch. 11 (U.K.).
3 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
36, 47 (Can.); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 42 (Can.).
4 In Canada, the equivalent terminology is "reasonable and probable grounds." See
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 167-68 (Can.) ("The state's interest in
detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the individual's interest in being left
alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion."). Courts have not
consistently articulated a precise or quantifiable definition of "probable." Some courts have
treated it as equivalent to "more likely than not," but others have suggested that it signifies a
lesser degree of probability. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149-50
(3d ed. 2000); R.E. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.1140 (6th ed. 2005).
Courts in both nations have also recognized many circumstances in which, despite the
existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the constitution does not require warrants,
probable cause, or either. In some situations, police may obtain warrants or conduct
warrantless searches on the basis of a lesser standard of suspicion (often called "reasonable
suspicion"). See JAMES A. FONTANA, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CANADA 458-59,
552-55, 595-97 (6th ed. 2005); LAFAVE ET AL., supra, at 148.
5 See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 393-94 (3d ed. 1996); Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by
the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188.
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identity, personality, or liberty.6 And while they often acknowledge the
existence of countervailing interests, they generally treat privacy as an
unalloyed social good.7
There are several problems with this approach, which I refer to as the
"moral" conception of privacy. First, casting privacy as a moral right is
normatively questionable.8 It is not at all clear that privacy is as central to
human flourishing as most deontologically-oriented jurists claim.9 Second,
to the extent that it is important, the moral approach does a poor job of
identifying the circumstances in which privacy should prevail over
countervailing interests, such as the deterrence of crime. Third, neither the
Fourth Amendment nor § 8 of the Charter protects privacy in a
"fundamental" manner; they protect only the right to be free from
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.' 0 Even gross privacy invasions may
be justified when the State can show that they are likely to reveal evidence
of serious crimes." As courts in both countries have recognized,
constitutional search and seizure decisions (including threshold reasonable
expectation of privacy determinations) call for some kind of instrumentalist
cost-benefit calculation. 2 Yet by conceptualizing privacy in moral terms,
6 See, e.g., Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1001-03 (1964); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
7 See R v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417,429 (Can.) ("[A]II information about a person is
in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or retain for himself as he sees fit."
(quoting TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS: A REPORT OF
A TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED JOINTLY BY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS/DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 13 (1972))); Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and
Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 871 (2000) ("Liberals have generally
assumed that privacy is something people want and that the main goal of public policy is to
enhance their capacity to get what they want."); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967).
8 The literature is replete with debates over the core meaning or meanings of privacy.
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002);
Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L.
REV. 1447 (1976). The chief concern of this paper is informational privacy (i.e., privacy of
personal information), which is the key privacy interest implicated by governmental use of
advanced search and surveillance technologies. See generally Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at
429-30 (describing informational privacy).
9 See Richard Posner, The Right To Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 406-09 (1978)
[hereinafter Posner, Right to Privacy].
10 See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 61-62 (1988).
11 See, e.g., R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, 517 (Can.) (recognizing that invasive
body cavity searches would require "greater" justification than routine pat-down and strip
searches).
12 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (stressing the need to find "a
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courts have largely failed to perform this calculation with rigor, clarity, or
transparency.
The intent of this Article, then, is to develop a fully instrumentalist
approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The obvious place
to start is economic analysis. There is a flourishing literature on the law
and economics of privacy. Drawing mostly from the economics of
information, 13 legal economists have taken on a wide variety of privacy
issues. 14  There have been few attempts, however, to apply economic
insights to search and seizure law. 15 This Article aims to help fill this gap.
I provide an accounting of the costs and benefits of governmental privacy
intrusions and propose a framework for making reasonable expectation of
privacy decisions that maximize social welfare.
In contrast to the prevailing moral approach, which treats privacy as a
fundamental right, the economic approach views it as a normatively neutral
aspect of self-interest: the desire to conceal and control potentially
damaging personal information. In this view, privacy should not be
protected when its primary effect is to impede the optimal deterrence of
crime. However, in other cases legal protections against governmental
surveillance may enhance social welfare by encouraging productive
workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("[T]he
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion
on ... Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("There can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails."); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 159-60
(Can.) (saying that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is an assessment "as to whether
in a particular situation the public's interest in being left alone by government must give way
to the government's interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order to advance its
goals, notably those of law enforcement"); see also Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism,
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 234-36 (1993).
13 See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. REILY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION (1992); INES MACHO-STADLER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS
OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS (2d ed. 2001).
14 See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 194-210 (1987);
David Friedman, Privacy and Technology, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 186 (2000); Posner, Right
to Privacy, supra note 9; George Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and
Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980).
15 Exceptions include Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 951 (2003); Hugo M. Mialon & Sue H. Mialon, The Economics of the Fourth
Amendment: Crime, Search, and Anti-Utopia (Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=591667; Andrew Song, Technology, Terrorism, and the Fishbowl
Effect: An Economic Analysis of Surveillance and Searches (Berkman Center Research
Publication No. 2003-04, Harvard Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 73, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-422220.
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transactions, diminishing the costs of non-legal privacy barriers, and
limiting suboptimal policing practices such as discriminatory profiling and
the enforcement of inefficient criminal prohibitions. Economics and public
choice theory can also help to minimize decision-making error by
predicting which legal actors-police, legislatures, or courts-are best
placed to make optimal trade-offs between privacy and crime control.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I briefly describe the
American and Canadian Supreme Courts' reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrines and highlight their chief inadequacy: the indeterminacy of the
"public exposure" and "intimacy" doctrines that the Courts have used to
decide whether to regulate novel search technologies. Section III outlines
the economic approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Sections IV and V apply this approach to two novel search technologies:
infrared imaging and location tracking. This analysis suggests that courts
should recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the latter case, but
not the former. Section VI concludes.
II. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE AND NOVEL
SEARCH TECHNOLOGIES
The use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test dates from the
United States Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz v. United States.'
6
Katz famously departed from the prevailing conception of Fourth
Amendment searches as physical trespasses into "constitutionally-
protected" areas.' 7 In deciding that the placement of an electronic listening
and recording device outside a public telephone booth was a search, Justice
Stewart declared for the majority that the Fourth Amendment protected
"people, not places,"' i8 and the surreptitious interception of the petitioner's
conversation "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied."' 9 The
"reasonable expectation" phraseology, however, stems from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion. Harlan stated, in language later adopted by a
majority of the Court, that to be considered a search, it must be shown both
that a person "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and... that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
16 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1960).
18 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also id. at 353 ("Once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and
seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or




'reasonable."' 20  In its first decision interpreting § 8 of the Charter, the
Supreme Court of Canada adopted the same approach.2'
How, then, have courts gone about deciding what constitutes a
"reasonable expectation of privacy"? This is not the place to summarize the
reams of doctrine on the question.22 It will be helpful, however, to provide
some sense of how the American and Canadian Supreme Courts have
applied the test to novel search technologies.
Not surprisingly (and contrary to Justice Harlan's dictum in Katz),
courts have not considered the existence of a subjective expectation of
privacy to be a necessary condition of constitutional protection;23 otherwise,
police could simply advertise their intention to monitor everything capable
of being monitored. 4 Moreover, people who were more suspicious or
aware of governmental surveillance would receive less constitutional
protection than those more trusting or ignorant.25 The focus has instead
been on the second component of Harlan's formula: whether an expectation
of privacy is "reasonable."
Like other reasonableness standards, on its face, the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is extremely vague. Insofar as it gauges
"expectations" of privacy (both subjective and objective) in relation to
prevailing social and technological conditions, it is also tautological. As
Wasserstrom and Seidman have put it, "Reasonable expectations are
20 Id. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). For examples of later cases adopting Harlan's
language, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
21 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 159 (Can.) ("The guarantee of security
from unreasonable search and seizure only protects a reasonable expectation.").
22 See generally SCOTT C. HUTCHISON & JAMES C. MORTON, SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
IN CANADA (1990); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 4.
23 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979); R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
432, 451-52 (Can.).
24 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 384 (1974); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 647, 675-76 (1988).
25 Surveillance-related paranoia could thus to some extent be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
See Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 452 ("It is one thing to say that a person who puts out the
garbage has no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. It is quite another to say that
someone who fears their telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective expectation of
privacy and thereby forfeits the protection of s. 8."); Gutterman, supra note 24, at 675 ("A
citizen's unfounded belief that his private activities were not protected had a 'self-
determining' quality: the fourth amendment's protections as he perceived them were the
maximum benefit that he could obtain.").
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defined by reference to a current reality that includes the very practices
under attack, rather than by reference to the kinds of expectations people
would have in a normatively attractive society., 26  The test's language
implies that we can expect less and less constitutional protection for privacy
as technology continues to enhance the power and lower the costs of
surveillance.27
To be sure, courts have attempted to suffuse the test with normative
content.28 They have pointed out many virtues of privacy and catalogued
myriad factors influencing reasonable expectation of privacy decisions. But
the key conceptual tools that the courts have developed to aid these
decisions-the public exposure and intimacy doctrines-have produced
little jurisprudential consistency, predictability, or consensus.
A. PUBLIC EXPOSURE
The public exposure doctrine exempts from constitutional protection
information voluntarily disclosed to the public. As Justice Stewart
explained in Katz, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. 29  The doctrine is a natural
outgrowth of liberal moral theory. If rational, autonomous agents freely
choose to expose information to the public, then they cannot complain if
others use that information against them.
It seems axiomatic that information voluntarily released into the public
domain cannot attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. The problem, of
course, is that the meanings of "voluntary" and "public" are sometimes
contestable. People frequently divulge information, for example, assuming
that it will be used only for certain limited purposes. 30  They may also
26 Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 63-64.
27 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(considering whether a sense-enhancing technology in general public use "is somewhat
perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as
the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available"); Cloud, supra note 12, at
262 ("If a majority of Justices ever were to conclude that satellite technology was generally
available to the public, then its use for government surveillance would not constitute a search
regulated by the amendment."); Gutterman, supra note 24, at 720 ("The fourth amendment
may now be defined solely by the degree of sophistication used in the surveillance and the
speed by which technological advances become generally disseminated and available to the
public.").
28 See, e.g., Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R at 452 ("Expectation of privacy is a normative
rather than a descriptive standard.").
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citation omitted).
30 See R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, 642 (Can.); R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417,
2007]
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subject themselves to observation assuming that their .identities will likely
remain anonymous. But what happens when technological search tools
upend these assumptions? Can we still say that there has been a voluntary
exposure?
Judges have given divergent answers to these questions. For example,
the American and Canadian Supreme Courts have differed on the question
of whether the electronic interception of speech constitutes a "search" when
one of the speakers is an undercover police informant. As discussed, the
United States Supreme Court established in Katz that surreptitious
interceptions of private communications are Fourth Amendment searches.
Soon after, however, it decided that when one of the communicators is
aware of the interception, Katz does not apply.3 1 In United States v. White,
the Court held that if the law "gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose
trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations
which are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case."
32
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a different approach.
Following Katz, it has unsurprisingly ruled that the surreptitious electronic
interception of private communications invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy.33 But in R. v. Duarte, it rejected the "risk analysis" of White and
held that participant surveillance also constitutes a § 8 search. 34 Writing for
the Court, Justice La Forest asserted that while § 8 does not protect people
from the risk that their confidants will turn out to be informers, it does
prohibit the State from arbitrarily making a "permanent electronic record"
429-30 (Can.).
31 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that there was
no expectation of privacy when a defendant communicates with an informant surreptitiously
carrying a "wire" transmitting conversations to police). White therefore confirmed the
vitality of the Court's pre-Katz jurisprudence on participant intercepts. See also Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (concluding that there was no Fourth Amendment search
where a government agent records a conversation with the suspect with a concealed
electronic device); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1954) (ruling that there was no
Fourth Amendment search where the suspect's conversations with an undercover agent were
transmitted to other agents via a concealed radio transmitter).
32 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 752.
33 See R. v. Thompson, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111, 1136-37 (Can.); R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1
S.C.R. 62 (Can.); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 42 (Can.) ("[S]urreptitious electronic
surveillance of the individual by an agency of the state constitutes an unreasonable search or
seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.").
34 Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 42. In so doing, the Court struck down what was then
§ 178.11 of the Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 (1985), which exempted participant
surveillance from the prohibition against warrantless electronic surveillance. Duarte, [1990]
1 S.C.R. at 42.
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of their conversations.35 The Court similarly held in R. v. Wong that
surreptitious video surveillance (without audio interception) invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
36
Similar differences have arisen over whether it invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy to follow a suspect's vehicle over public roads using
a surreptitiously-planted, radio-frequency tracking device. In United States
v. Knotts, the United States Supreme Court held that it did not.37 This type
of surveillance, the Court reasoned, revealed no more information than
could have been obtained through visual surveillance of the vehicle from
public vantage points. "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment," then-Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them .... ,38 In United States v. Karo, however,
the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment is engaged when beepers are
used to track items within private residences.39 Unlike in Knotts, the Court
noted, the beeper in Karo was used "to obtain information that it could not
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house. 4°
Though it seemed reluctant to do so, the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded in R. v. Wise that the use of a beeper to monitor a vehicle on
public roads invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. 4' The Court
declared, however, that the invasion of privacy was minimal. 42  "This
particular beeper," the majority stated, "was a very rudimentary extension
of physical surveillance. 43
" Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 48. Note however that § 8 of the Charter is not violated
when someone privy to an illegally recorded communication (such as an undercover agent
wearing a "wire") testifies at trial as to their recollection of the communication, even if the
participant's memory has been refreshed by reference to the tainted recording. But § 8 is
violated when portions of an illegally obtained recording or transcript that a witness does not
recall are adduced in evidence. See R. v. Fliss, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535 (Can.).
36 R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (Can.) (holding that when police placed a hidden
video camera in the wall of the suspects' hotel room, they violated a reasonable expectation
of privacy).
37 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding that when police
attached a beeper to a chemical container that the suspect subsequently placed in his vehicle,
the police violated a reasonable expectation of privacy).
38 Id. at 283.
39 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
40 Id. at 715.
41 R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 538 (Can.).
42 Id. at 534-36.
43 Id. at 535. Notably, the Crown had conceded that the installation of the beeper
violated § 8. Id. at 532, 538. Not surprisingly, the Canadian Supreme Court concluded that
despite the violation, the trial judge should not have excluded evidence obtained from the
beeper. Id. at 539-48. The Court also recommended the passage of legislation authorizing
2007)
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There has also been disagreement on whether a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in relation to the non-content "envelope" information
accompanying electronic communications. 44 In Smith v. Maryland, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the installation and use of a "pen
register," which records the numbers dialed from a telephone, did not
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.45 The Court noted that the
register did not record the content of conversations and suggested that
people are aware that the numbers they dial may be recorded for
commercial and law enforcement purposes.46 In any event, it concluded,
any expectation of privacy was not reasonable, as a person has "no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties. 47 In Canada, in contrast, several lower courts have found that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to telephone
envelope information, so warrants to seize it must be based on probable
cause.
48
tracking warrants and hinted that a "lower standard" of suspicion would be sufficient to
justify them. Id. at 548-49. As discussed infra note 143, Parliament subsequently enacted a
provision authorizing the issuance of tracking warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
44 "Envelope" information refers to addressing and other information attached to a
communication that is the functional equivalent of the information contained on the outside
of a letter mail envelope. See Orin Kerr, Internet Surveillance After the USA Patriot Act:
The Big Brother That Isn 't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 611-16 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Internet
Surveillance].
45 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). It is implicit in the Court's decision that
"trap and trace" devices, which record the numbers associated with incoming telephone
calls, do not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775, 780 (S.C. 1991) ("In light of the holding in Smith, we cannot hold
that the telephone number of the equipment from which a call has been placed is entitled to
more privacy than the telephone numbers called by someone.").
46 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
41 Id. at 743-44. The Supreme Court of Canada has not considered communications
envelope data. Before 1993, most lower Canadian courts had followed the United States
Supreme Court in holding that the seizure of such data did not invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See R. v. Sampson, [1983] 45 Nlfd. & P.E.I.R. 32 (Nfld. C.A.)
(Can.); R. v. Fegan, [1993] 13 O.R.3d 88 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.). In 1993, Parliament enacted a
warrant provision authorizing such seizures on the basis of reasonable suspicion. See infra
note 142-145 and accompanying text.
48 See R. v. Nguyen, [2004] B.C.J. No. 248 51 (B.C. S.C.) (Can.) (use of reasonable
suspicion warrant to obtain a record of outgoing and incoming telephone numbers from the
defendant's mobile phone violated § 8); R. v. Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (Can.) (holding that the Criminal Code provision authorizing reasonable suspicion
warrants for telephone envelope information violates § 8).
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B. INTIMACY
As its name suggests, the intimacy doctrine holds that searches
revealing sensitive personal information are more likely to trigger a
reasonable expectation of privacy than those uncovering only mundane
information. Like the public exposure doctrine, the intimacy doctrine is
intuitively appealing.49 People are less concerned about disclosing routine
details of their daily lives than potentially stigmatizing information, such as
views or activities relating to sexuality, politics, or religion. And like the
public exposure doctrine, the intimacy doctrine derives from liberal moral
philosophy. For liberal privacy theorists, intimate information is more
central to autonomy, identity, and personality than non-intimate
information. °
But as legal economists have pointed out, intimate information is not
self-evidently deserving of legal protection.5 1  Under competitive
conditions, there is no reason to protect one party's ability to conceal
private information. In voluntary transactions (whether economic or
social), the parties' preferences for knowledge and privacy should generate
the disclosure of the efficient amount of information. 2 Granting legal
protection for the concealment of discreditable (but truthful) information is
inefficient because it increases the cost of productive transactions. If it is
inefficient to protect sellers' ability to misrepresent the quality of their
goods, then it is equally inefficient to protect people's ability to
misrepresent their character to others.5 3 By limiting our ability to discern
others' characters, trustworthiness, and other attributes, privacy either
increases the cost of or deters productive economic and social interactions.
It is inappropriate, some might argue, to analogize the state's attempt
to obtain personal information to the sale of goods between private parties.
But the case for protecting intimate, private information from governmental
scrutiny rests on the same ground as in private transactions. While the
capacity of government to cause harm by collecting personal information is
great, so is the people's capacity to cause harm by concealing it. More
49 See generally R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 722 (Can.) ("[P]rivacy concerns are at
their strongest where aspects of one's individual identity are at stake, such as in the context
of information 'about one's lifestyle, intimate relations or political or religious opinions."').
50 See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 6; Gavison, supra note 6, at 444-45; Jonathan Kahn,
Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 371 (2003);
Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1977); Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
51 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 627.
52 Posner, Right to Privacy, supra note 9, at 399-400; Stigler, supra note 14, at 627.
53 See Posner, Right to Privacy, supra note 9, at 399-400.
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crime is the inevitable consequence of inhibiting the government's ability to
uncover discreditable, private information. However, as discussed in detail
below, allowing police to obtain personal information by certain means may
sometimes generate suboptimal outcomes; for example, unrestricted
wiretapping might inhibit communication or induce wasteful spending on
measures to protect privacy. In such cases, it may be efficient to regulate
investigative methods that invade privacy. This suggests that in
determining the constitutionality of a novel search technique, courts should
focus on the methods used by police rather than the nature of the
information those methods reveal. In most cases, this is precisely what the
law does. When police can demonstrate sufficient grounds for suspicion,
they are permitted to collect highly intimate information.54
Of course, courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test to
determine whether police can search in the absence of such a
demonstration. In such cases, it could be argued that gauging the intimacy
of the information revealed by a search technique helps predict whether
regulating the technique would prevent inefficient behavioral responses.
In practice, however, measuring the inherent intimacy of information
has proven to be exceedingly difficult. Courts have come to varying
conclusions, for example, on the question of whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy is invaded when information normally contained in
constitutionally protected areas (such as residences, vehicles, or luggage) is
extracted by "sense-enhancing" technologies. Before and after Katz, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the use of flashlights and telescopic
lenses does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.55 In California v.
Ciraolo, the Court came to the same conclusion with respect to the visual
observation of property from the air (with either the untrained eye or
cameras), so long as the airspace is "public[ly] navigable," and the search is
"in a physically nonintrusive manner., 56 The Ciraolo Court reasoned that
54 See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
55 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303 (1987) (upholding the police use of a
flashlight from an "open field" vantage point to illuminate a barn's interior); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (ruling that the police use of a flashlight to illuminate a
portion of an automobile interior open to plain sight is not a search); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) ("[U]se of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass
or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution.").
56 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (approving the police's unaided visual
surveillance from 1000 feet of a backyard enclosed by high double fences); see also Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (upholding the police's unaided visual surveillance of a
partially-covered greenhouse from 400 feet); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986) (allowing the police's use of high-resolution mapping camera at 12,000, 3,000, and
1,200 feet to photograph industrial facilities shielded from ground-level observation). As the
United States v. Kyllo majority noted, the only one of these cases in which police used a
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activities that are "clearly visible" from a "public vantage point" are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment." It warned, however, that it might
decide differently where observations are made with "modem technology
which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or
activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens" 58 or "highly
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology." 59
The Court heeded this warning in Kyllo v. United States, where a
narrow majority ruled that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by
using an infrared camera to detect heat radiating from a residential
marijuana growing operation, despite the fact that the device was not
physically penetrating and showed only crude images of relatively warmer
and cooler areas. 60  "[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area,"' Justice Scalia wrote, "constitutes a search-at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public use.",61 The Court came
to a different conclusion in two cases where police used drug sniffing dogs
to detect narcotics concealed in airport luggage62 and the trunk of a
vehicle.63 Such searches are relatively non-intrusive, the Court concluded,
and reveal no information other than the presence of contraband.64
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet dealt with either visual
aerial surveillance or drug sniffing dogs. Lower courts, however, have
typically rejected the American approach and found a reasonable
expectation of privacy.65 But in R. v. Tessling,66 the Supreme Court
technological aid to the naked eye, Dow, involved surveillance of commercial buildings-
not a private residence. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
57 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
58 Id. at 215 n.3 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 14-15, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (No. 84-
1513)).
59 Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
60 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. I discuss Kyllo in detail infra notes 151-165 and accompanying
text.
61 Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
62 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
63 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
64 See id.; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
65 See R. v. Lam, [2003] 178 C.C.C.3d 59, 69-72 (Alta. C.A.) (Can.) (concluding that a
sniff of luggage and luggage locker at bus terminal by a trained dog invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy); R. v. Cook, [1999] A.B.Q.B. 351 55-62 (Alta. Q.B.) (Can.)
(ruling that the unaided visual surveillance of a residential lot from 50-100 (but not 1,000)
feet invades a reasonable expectation of privacy); R. v. Kelly, [1999] 169 D.L.R. (4th) 720,
735-37 (N.B. C.A.) (Can.) (holding that the unaided aerial surveillance of residential garden
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unanimously held (on the same facts as Kyllo) that warrantless infrared
camera searches did not violate § 8 of the Charter. "[H]eat distribution,"
Justice Binnie stated, "offers no insight into [the suspect's] private life, and
reveals nothing of his 'biographical core of personal information."'
67
The limitations of the intimacy doctrine have also been exposed in a
line of cases dealing with searches of third party information databases. In
United States v. Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that
prosecutors invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy when they
subpoenaed a suspect's banking records.68 The records contained only
"information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business." 69 "The depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another," the Court reasoned, "that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government... even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.,
70
The Supreme Court of Canada has not dealt definitively with banking
records, though some of its members have suggested that they do attract a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 71 Lower courts have come to varying
conclusions.72  The Supreme Court has decided, however, that no
reasonable expectation of privacy was invaded when police obtained a
from any altitude invades a reasonable expectation of privacy).
66 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (Can.). I discuss Tessling in detail infra notes 151-165 and
accompanying text.
67 Id. 63 (citing R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.)).
68 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
69 Id. at 442.
70 Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 765, 751-52 (1971)).
71 In Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada considered
whether the seizure of a suspect's foreign banking records violated § 8 of the Charter.
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (Can.). The majority concluded that the Canadian government's request
for foreign assistance did not engage § 8; it declined to consider whether a warrantless
search of a suspect's domestic banking records would have attracted a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Lamer indicated that he would
have answered "yes" to this question. Id. 22 (Lamer, C.J., concurring). In his dissent,
Justice Iacobucci concluded that the suspect did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his foreign banking records. Id. 55 (lacobucci, J., dissenting).
72 See R. v. Eddy, [1994] 119 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91 183-84 (Nfld. S.C.) (Can.) (holding
that a police inquiry as to the owner of a bank account and whether any transactions had
occurred on a particular date invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy); R. v. Lillico,
[1994] 92 C.C.C.3d 90 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) (holding that a police request for information
with respect to a single check and subsequent account activity did not invade reasonable
expectation of privacy).
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suspect's electrical consumption records from the local utility. 73  "Such
records," Justice Sopinka wrote, do not invade that "biographical core of
personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society
would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state. 74 The
records, he reasoned, "cannot reasonably be said to reveal intimate details
of the appellant's life since electricity consumption reveals very little about
the personal lifestyle or private decisions of the occupant of the
residence. 75
III. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
Can economics point the way to a more determinate and normatively
satisfying approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test? As
mentioned, economists typically view privacy as an aspect of rational self-
interest. 76 They posit that privacy permits people to conceal (discreditable)
personal information that might be used to their disadvantage. 77 It is in
people's interest to maximize this ability, selectively disclosing (and
thereafter controlling) their personal information to achieve desired ends.78
This, however, is not always in society's interests.7 9 If privacy in a
particular realm is used chiefly to conceal socially harmful conduct (such as
crime), then legal protection for privacy in that realm should be weak and
police should be given broad search powers. If, on the other hand, privacy
encourages efficient behaviors, then legal protections should be strong and
police powers should be limited. Courts applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test to an investigative technique should thus identify
73 R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (Can.).
14 Id. at 293.
75 id.
76 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual
Decision Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 26 (2005).
77 See Richard Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: And Putting it Back Together Again, 17
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 12-14 (2000); Posner, Right to Privacy, supra note 9, at 399; Charles
M. Kahn et al., A Theory of Transactions Privacy 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working
Paper No. 2000-22, 2000), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/01 12.pdf;
see also Allen, supra note 7, at 872. Empirical evidence has indicated that group members'
concern for privacy increases in relation to the degree to which they perceive that their
characteristics (such as age and weight) deviate from the group's norm. See Bemardo
Huberman et al., Valuating Privacy, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 22 (2005), available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/deviance/deviance.pdf.
78 See James B. Rule, Toward Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and
Institutions, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183, 188 (2004).




and weigh the costs and benefits of limiting the state's ability to obtain
information about criminal suspects.
A. PRIVACY COSTS
The costs of privacy are the easiest to discern. By thwarting the
detection and punishment of criminals, legal privacy protections generate
two types of social costs. First, most crimes are inefficient, 80 so privacy
laws detract from social welfare by diminishing the deterrence of crime.
For example, if police cannot use electronic surveillance to acquire
evidence that would support an application to obtain a warrant to physically
search a suspected drug dealer's home, and there is no other equally
effective investigative technique available, fewer physical searches will
occur, diminishing the probability of punishment and thus the expected cost
of dealing drugs. Drug dealing will thus become a more attractive
endeavor. Second, by restricting the use of particular search techniques,
privacy laws may force authorities to use more costly substitutes. 8 For
example, if police replace electronic surveillance with undercover
informants, law enforcement costs may rise, as undercover operations are
very likely more expensive and dangerous than electronic surveillance.
B. PRIVACY BENEFITS
Though privacy's social benefits are somewhat more obscure, they are
by no means insignificant. While privacy makes it easier for people to
engage in antisocial conduct (including crime), it may also provide an
incentive for productive activity.82 Privacy may thus reduce "avoidance
costs"; that is, the opportunity cost of forgoing socially beneficial
transactions due to the fear of disclosure of information that could be used
against those that disclose. There are two types of avoidance costs that
privacy laws can mitigate. First, privacy enhances the quantity and quality
of interpersonal communications. For example, legal restrictions on
eavesdropping (by police or nosy neighbors) free people to communicate
more candidly. 83 Privacy diminishes the risk that the information that we
80 See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 443 (3d ed.
2000).
81 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 628-29.
82 See Song, supra note 15, at 3.
83 See Epstein, supra note 77, at 9; Charles J. Hartmann & Stephen M. Renas, Anglo-
American Privacy Law: An Economic Analysis, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 133, 145 (1985);
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979)
[hereinafter Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation]; Posner, Right to Privacy, supra note
9, at 401-03. For a similar argument articulated in non-economic terms, see Amsterdam,
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rationally disclose to intended recipients will be obtained (and used to our
detriment) by unintended recipients.84  Conversely, widespread
eavesdropping causes people to be more formal and guarded in their
communications-not only in relation to criminal conversations, but also
those revealing discreditable (but non-criminal) information. 85 As Richard
Posner states, the "principal effect of allowing eavesdropping would not be
to make the rest of society more informed about the individual but to make
conversations more cumbersome and less effective. 86 This helps to explain
why legal protections against invasions of communicative privacy are so
robust.87
Second, privacy (in the form of anonymity) may encourage people to
participate in beneficial activities that they would not engage in otherwise.88
supra note 24, at 388.
84 The benefits of privacy in promoting productive activity are magnified when the
activity produces external benefits. Communication is especially likely to generate positive
externalities. Information revealed under the cloak of privacy in pursuit of self-interest may
also be highly valuable to the intended recipients of that information. But if the absence of
privacy means that the marginal private cost of revealing the information is greater than the
private benefit, the information will not be disclosed, and the external benefits will not
materialize. See Peter H. Huang, The Law and Economics of Consumer Privacy Versus
Data Mining (Working Paper, 1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-94041; Song,
supra note 15, at 11-12.
Another benefit of privacy (more relevant in the case of private transactions than
governmental surveillance) is that it can increase the amount of socially productive
information. In the absence of privacy, there would be little incentive for people to invest in
obtaining valuable information, since this information would be easily obtainable. This is
the economic justification for the law of confidentiality, which provides contractual and tort
remedies for disclosures of information imparted in confidence. See, e.g., Ejan Mackaay,
Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 867 (1990). I am indebted to Norman Siebrasse for this insight.
85 See R. v. Fliss, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 535, 555 (Can.) ("In a free country, social discourse
should not be inhibited by a concern that conversations are being secretly recorded and
transcribed without lawful independent prior authorization."); R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
30, 50 (Can.) ("Few of us would ever speak freely if we knew that all our words were being
captured by machines for later release before an unknown and potentially hostile audience.
No one talks to a recorder as he talks to a person.").
86 Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, supra note 83, at 18; see also Posner, Right
to Privacy, supra note 9, at 403.
87 See R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, 47 (Can.); R. v. Thompson, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111
(Can.); R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62 (Can.); Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; see also
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 184(1) (1985) (criminalizing the willful
interception of private electronic communications).
88 This goal might also be furthered by restricting law enforcement's ability to disclose
information that it has collected for reasons unrelated to the furtherance of criminal
investigations and prosecutions. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, Ill
YALE L.J. 2137, 2183-85 (2002) [hereinafter Stuntz, Local Policing].
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This is a social benefit that must be measured against privacy's impact in
facilitating crime. If teenagers were required to provide proof of identity
before purchasing condoms, for example, sexually transmitted diseases and
unwanted pregnancies would become more prevalent. Similarly, the
placement of video surveillance cameras in a high-crime neighborhood
could dissuade people from using nearby needle exchanges or AIDS clinics.
Privacy laws may also reduce the costs associated with protecting
privacy by non-legal means: defensive costs. 8 9  Instead of avoiding
communications or activities that could reveal personal information, people
may wastefully expend resources to protect their privacy.90  Without
wiretapping laws, for example, people would be more likely to use public
payphones instead of their own phones.
In the absence of legal privacy protections, the likelihood that people
will employ non-legal substitutes depends on both the price of those
substitutes and the elasticity of the demand for privacy. This insight may
help us decide when it is cost-justified to regulate governmental
surveillance. Suppose that there were no law limiting police's ability to
intercept or search e-mail communications. People using e-mail for non-
criminal purposes could rationally conclude that the marginal private
benefit of encrypting e-mail is lower than its cost.91 Such persons would
suffer the costs incurred by either exposing sensitive information or using
more costly methods of communication. The marginal private benefit of
using encryption for criminal purposes, in contrast, would in most cases be
higher than for non-criminal purposes. Criminals are consequently more
likely to use encryption to thwart governmental surveillance than non-
criminals. In these circumstances, regulating the state's ability to obtain e-
mail communications is likely to reduce non-criminals' avoidance costs
without substantially diminishing the deterrence of crime.
So far I have been discussing the value of privacy in fostering socially
productive non-criminal discourse and activity. I have assumed that there
is no value in protecting people against governmental intrusions revealing
criminal behavior. This assumption can be questioned. Where there is a
89 Friedman, supra note 14, at 192-93; Song. supra note 15, at 15-16.
90 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Amsterdam,
supra note 24, at 403 ("The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds before we
commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every
time we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.").
91 These include material costs, such as adoption and usage costs, as well as immaterial
costs, such as learning and switching costs as well as any social stigma associated with using
privacy-protecting technologies. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy
Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: Losses, Gains, and Hyperbolic Discounting, in THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 165 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004).
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strong consensus that the harms caused by a type of crime are severe, we
should be willing to tolerate the use of fairly intrusive investigative methods
as a means of deterrence, 92 provided that productive non-criminal behavior
is not unduly chilled. Privacy invasions are less acceptable, however, when
this consensus is not as strong, as is arguably the case for many
"consensual" crimes like drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling.93 In
economic terms, enforcing these prohibitions (or enforcing them through
privacy-invasive techniques) may be inefficient, as enforcement costs may
94outweigh the harms generated by the prohibited activities. In some cases,
therefore, legal privacy protections may help to limit the enforcement of
bad laws.
Privacy laws may also help to prevent governments from
discriminating against disfavored minorities. 95  Broad, discretionary
investigative powers are more likely to be used against those disadvantaged
by poverty, race, or ethnicity than powers constrained by the requirements
of prior authorization and probable cause.96 These requirements increase
the likelihood that searches will be based on concrete, individualized
suspicion-not discriminatory stereotypes.
But what exactly is discriminatory stereotyping? Economists
distinguish between "biased" profiling (based on animus towards members
of a minority group) and "statistical" profiling (arising from the
disproportionate targeting of group members based on an accurate
assessment of that group's offending rate).97 If group members are more
likely to commit a particular offense than people in the general population,
then many economists would say that it is legitimate to consider group
membership in deciding whom to investigate.98 If, on the other hand,
92 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 200; Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, supra
note 83, at 52-53.
93 See Gavison, supra note 6, at 452-53; Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, supra
note 83, at 53. In earlier times, criminal laws prohibiting alcohol trafficking, abortion,
homosexual intercourse, contraception, and miscegenation could have been added to this list.
94 See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323,
352 (2004) (writing that a cost-benefit analysis "is likely to suggest that for many crime
problems, criminal law is a suboptimal or poor choice").
95 See Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 415.
96 See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 94.
97 See Vani K. Borooah, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Reply, 18
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 607 (2002); Shanti P. Chakravarty, Economic Analysis of Police Stops
and Searches: A Critique, 18 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 597 (2002). Statistical discrimination is
sometimes referred to as "rational" discrimination. See Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws of
Probability Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling?, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 412, 413 (2003).
98 See John Donohue, The Law and Economics ofAntidiscrimination Law, in HANDBOOK
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offense rates for a particular crime are equal as between groups, then it is
likely that any inter-group disparity in arrest rates reflects bias against the
group with the higher arrest rate.
99
Which of these scenarios is closer to reality? Numerous studies have
shown that in many places in the United States, police are more likely to
stop and search African American and Hispanic drivers than white
drivers.100 Explanations for this disparity vary. Some researchers argue
that for offenses typically associated with "racial profiling,"10' minority and
majority offending rates are generally similar; they conclude therefore that
any disproportionate targeting of minorities indicates bias. 10 2  However,
many of the studies showing disproportionate stop rates have also found
that majority and minority "hit" rates (the ratio of successful to
unsuccessful searches) are very similar. Some have argued that this is
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. M. Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=763486.
99 We might say that police who engage in biased profiling have a "taste" for
discrimination; that is, the private cost to them of searching minority suspects is lower than
for searching white suspects. See generally GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES
(1996); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
100 In the United States, many law enforcement agencies record the race of targeted
suspects. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
41, 81-83 (2001); Katheryn K. Russell, Racial Profiling: A Status Report of the Legal,
Legislative, and Empirical Literature, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 6, 68-71 (2001). For the
most recent data, see Northeastern University, Data Collection Resource Center,
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). Most studies of
racial profiling have focused on highway traffic stops. See DAvID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN
INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 62-64 (2002); Samuel R. Gross &
Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,
101 MICH. L. REv. 651 (2002); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and
Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
296 (2001). On a particular stretch of 1-95 in Maryland, for example, African Americans are
nearly ten times more likely to be stopped than whites. See Dominitz, supra note 97, at 417.
There is also evidence that minorities are disproportionately targeted by police in many other
types of investigations. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 173-75 (2001).
Canadian police forces do not typically keep statistics on the basis of race or ethnicity;
thus, there has been little in the way of rigorous empirical analysis of profiling in Canada.
There is evidence, however, that at least some Canadian police forces disproportionately
target certain racial groups, especially African Canadians. See COMM'N ON SYSTEMIC
RACISM IN THE ONT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYs., REPORT 358 (1995).
10 I use the phrase "racial" or "ethnic" profiling to mean the taking of individuals' race
or ethnicity into account in deciding whether to investigate them, leading to the
disproportionate targeting of members of that group in relation to their numbers in the
relevant population. Profiling may thus be a result of either biased or statistical
discrimination.
102 See HARRIS, supra note 100.
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consistent with legitimate statistical discrimination based on higher
minority offending rates.103
Despite the ambiguity of the American data and the dearth of Canadian
evidence, there are good reasons to think that biased profiling is widespread
in both countries, and that it likely generates significant social costs that in
most cases outweigh any concomitant benefits. There is strong evidence,
for example, that police in several U.S. states search Hispanic motorists
much more frequently than can be explained by statistical discrimination.1
0 4
And rigorously designed psychological experimentation has shown that
racial, ethnic, and gender stereotyping are pervasive and insidious. 10 5 This
103 This assumes drivers who face a higher probability of being searched will be less
likely to carry contraband. It assumes, in other words, that the relationship between policing
and offending is elastic. It follows that when faced with higher hit rates for minority
suspects, unbiased police will disproportionately target minorities until hit rates equalize.
Data from Maryland, for example, reveal that while African American drivers are many
times more likely to be searched than whites, African American and white hit rates are very
similar. See John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 219-22 (2001) (analysis of Maryland statistics that shows
similar hit rates for searches of African American and white drivers but lower hit rates for
Hispanics); see also Vani K. Borooah, Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An
Economic Analysis, 17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 17, 35 (2001) (English study finding little
disparity in success rates for searches of different racial groups); Ruben HernAndez-Murillo
& John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?: Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45
INT'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004) (analysis of hit rates in Missouri for discretionary and non-
discretionary searches that shows strong evidence of bias against Hispanics and weaker
evidence of bias against African Americans); Jeff Dominitz & John Knowles, Crime
Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn From Police Search Data? (Penn
Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper No. 05-019, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-719981 (summarizing other recent hit rate analyses).
Dominitz demonstrates that if the hit rate theory is correct, then it would be impossible to
simultaneously equalize rates (as between racial groups) of apprehending the guilty and
detaining the innocent. See Dominitz, supra note 97, at 423-24. Policymakers, in other
words, would have to choose between ending the disproportionate searching of innocent
minority drivers and ensuring that guilty minority drivers are as likely to be caught as whites.
See id. at 423-24.
104 See Hemndez-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 103; Knowles et al., supra note 103,
at 219-22.
105 The psychological dynamics of racial and other forms of stereotyping, which are
often deployed subconsciously and reflexively, are described by Jerry Kang in Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499-1520 (2004). Kang summarizes recent
social cognition research as follows:
There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social category... predicts
disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category. This occurs notwithstanding
contrary explicit commitments in favor of racial equality. In other words, even if our sincere
self-reports of bias score zero, we would still engage in disparate treatment of individuals on the
basis of race, consistent with our racial schemas. Controlled, deliberative, rational processes are
not the only forces guiding our behavior. That we are not even aware of, much less intending,
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research supports the growing recognition among jurists, especially in
Canada, that racial bias (including biased investigative profiling) is an
endemic feature of the criminal justice system.1"6
Moreover, even unbiased statistical profiling may generate undesirable
distributive outcomes. 107 Even if we restrict our assessment of the social
costs of profiling to conventional economic concerns, it is not clear that
statistical profiling is efficient. As Bernard Harcourt has argued, law
enforcement efficiency is not achieved by equalizing hit rates, but rather by
minimizing both crime and enforcement costs. 0 8  Profiling is efficient,
therefore, only when it: (1) reduces the amount of profiled crime;' 0 9 (2)
does not diminish the efficient allocation of police resources; and (3) does
not produce a "ratchet effect"ll on the profiled population."'
such race-contingent behavior does not magically erase the harm.
Id. at 1514; see also Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law and Economics and Racial
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 288-89 (2005). Audit studies have revealed similar
results. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
106 See, e.g., R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 (Can.); R. v. S.(R.D.), [199713 S.C.R.
484, 505 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dub6, McLachlin, JJ., concurring); R. v. C.R.H., [2003] 174
C.C.C.3d 67, 81-82 (Man. C.A.) (Can.); R. v. Brown, [2003] 64 O.R.3d 161, 165 (Ont. C.A.)
(Can.); R. v. Parks, [1993] 84 C.C.C.3d 353 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.); COMM'N ON SYSTEMIC
RACISM IN THE ONT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 100; RICHARD V. ERICSON,
REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK 200-01 (1982); Julian V. Roberts
& Anthony N. Doob, Race, Ethnicity and Criminal Justice in Canada, in ETHNICITY, CRIME
AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 469, 519 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1997).
107 See Donohue, supra note 98, at 23-25 (discussing how statistical discrimination can
lead to the reinforcement of stereotypes that worsen the disadvantage of historically
subordinated groups); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 157-58 (1997)
(noting that discrimination, in whatever form, can reduce minorities' incentive to invest in
human capital).
108 See Bernard Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics,
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1281-82, 1307-15 (2004).
109 This condition may not be satisfied, for example, if the profiling of minority drivers
gives white drivers a sense of impunity and thus increases their criminal activity. More
generally, if law enforcement resources are fixed, profiling will reduce total crime "only if
the ratio of the minority to white motorist population is greater than the differential of the
change in offending by race." This will depend on the groups' elasticity of offending to
policing and their natural offending rates. Id. at 1279, 1281-82, 1296, 1306.
110 A "ratchet effect" occurs when profiling "produces a supervised population that is
disproportionate to the distribution of offending by racial group." Id. at 1329. By
unjustifiably targeting group members, profiling may increase the group's crime rate, as
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Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to determine directly whether
highway profiling meets these conditions. However, drawing from other
data sources, Harcourt argues that it probably does not. Minority drivers
likely have slightly lower elasticities of offending to policing than white
drivers,' 12 as well as slightly higher natural offending rates.' 13  As a
consequence, racial profiling is likely to both increase the crime rate (due to
diminished deterrence of white drivers) and cause a ratchet effect in
minority populations (resulting in disproportionate arrests and convictions
over and above any natural higher offending rate).1 4 As Harcourt notes,
this increase in negative contacts with police "will aggravate the
disproportional representation of minorities in the correctional population,
more unevenly distribute criminal records, supervision, and post-punitive
collateral consequences, and significantly boost the public perception that
minorities are drug users, traffickers, and couriers."
'" 5
Search and seizure law is neither the only nor the most direct means of
combating discriminatory profiling." 6  However, it is very difficult to
measured by arrest or conviction rates rather than actual offending. This is because the
former is always a fraction of latter. This increase in the group's crime rate will provide
justification, albeit false, for further wasteful profiling.
Il Id. at 1279-80.
112 This may result from minorities having fewer non-criminal employment
opportunities, as well as cultural factors. Id. at 1282, 1299, 1356-57; see also Nicola
Persico, Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472,
1474 (2002).
113 This is largely a product of greater minority participation in drug trafficking.
Harcourt, supra note 108, at 1282, 1371.
1'4 Id. at 1282, 1297-99, 1330-35, 1371-73.
115 Id. at 1282; see id. at 1329-31; see also Dominitz, supra note 97, at 425 ("[W]hen
police officers use race-ethnicity in stop and search decisions, the rate of apprehension of the
guilty will be higher for those groups that are searched at a higher rate ...."). Note that
Harcourt's approach does not require making a distinction between biased and statistical
profiling. In his estimation, the evidence shows that profiling, whatever the police's
motivation, is likely inefficient and counterproductive. As he states, "If targeting minority
motorists increases long-term offending on the highways or the overall costs to society, then
it is in effect racially prejudiced. It may be inadvertent and mistaken, but it is effectively
racist because it uses a racial category without any benefit to society." Harcourt, supra note
108, at 1306-07 (emphasis omitted).
It has also been argued that racial profiling, whether biased or statistical, may also lead to
higher rates of false arrests among minorities. Tomic and Hakes report that dismissal rates
for African Americans charged with offenses typically associated with racial profiling are
higher than those for whites, as well as for African Americans charged with other offenses.
This disparity is lower in counties with a greater proportion of African American police
officers, as well as in those with locally-elected judges and high proportions of African
Americans. See Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: New Evidence in
Racial Profiling (Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=618122.
116 See Sujit Choudhy, Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and Racial
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mitigate profiling directly.' 1 7  Proving bias in any individual case is
challenging, to say the least, and evidence of statistical disproportion cannot
in itself prove that any particular search is illegitimate." 8
One of the most effective ways to diminish discriminatory profiling
may therefore be to limit the ability of police to conduct discretionary
searches. As discussed, if a court finds that an investigative technique does
not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the technique is not a
"search" and police may use it without restriction. In applying the
reasonable expectation of privacy test to a novel search technique, courts
should therefore consider the extent to which the technique is likely to be
used in a discriminatory manner.
C. DECISION-MAKING ERROR
Constitutional provisions in Canada and the United States command
courts to protect people against unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures. These provisions, of course, are not the only sources of such
protection. In both countries, legislatures regulate search powers exercised
by executive authorities, and those authorities regulate themselves with
various non-legal mechanisms, including official policies and informal
norms. Microeconomic analysis and its public law offshoot, public choice
theory, can help determine which branch of government is best placed to
undertake such regulation. Cost-benefit calculations are made by self-
interested decision-makers with imperfect information." 9  Judges share
these imperfections, but they have some capacity to develop rules that take
their own and others' weaknesses into account. 120 Identifying the biases
Profiling and s. 15 of the Charter, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S
ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 367 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2001); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAW 138-63 (1997); Tim Quigley, Brief Investigatory Detentions: A
Critique of R. v. Simpson, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 935 (2004); Kent Roach, Making Progress on
Understanding and Remedying Racial Profiling, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 895 (2004); David M.
Tanovich, Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality
Based Conception ofArbitrary Detention, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 145 (2002).
117 See Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 88, at 2162-63, 2177-79.
118 Id. But see R. v. Brown, [2003] 64 O.R.3d 161, 174 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) ("[Wihere the
evidence shows that the circumstances relating to a detention correspond to the phenomenon
of racial profiling and provide a basis for the court to infer that the police officer is lying
about why he or she singled out the accused person for attention, the record is then capable
of supporting a finding that the stop was based on racial profiling.").
119 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Daniel A. Farber & Philip
P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
120 See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second Order Decisions, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 187 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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and information-gathering deficits of courts, legislatures, and police should
reduce the frequency and magnitude of the errors that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test inevitably generates.
The deficits of the police are obvious. While they may face pressure to
avoid egregious privacy intrusions, the incentives bearing on them tilt
heavily against investigative restraint. As individuals and institutions,
police are rewarded primarily for minimizing crime, and the benefits of
intrusive search techniques in achieving this objective are clear. In contrast,
apart from budgetary constraints, the social costs of surveillance, such as
those detailed above, are abstract, diffuse, and largely externalized;
accordingly, police have little incentive to either discover or take them into
account in exercising discretionary investigative powers.12 1 Police also lack
the institutional means to perform the kind of comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis that the reasonable expectation of privacy test entails.
Consequently, while crime control interests must obviously be considered
in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test, courts should not
show any significant degree of deference to police assessments of the need
for a search technique.
Therefore, the legislatures and courts are primarily responsible for
attaining an optimal balance between privacy and crime control. The key
question for judges in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test,
then, is to what extent they should defer to legislative decisions to regulate
or decline to regulate a particular investigative technique.
Legislatures generally have better access than courts to information
important to accurate decision-making in this area. This information comes
in two varieties. First, unlike judges, legislators are politically accountable,
and are thus in a better position to gauge citizens' preferences for privacy
and crime control. Second, legislatures have better access to information on
the nature and effects of investigative methods. This advantage is
especially apparent in the context of novel, technologically sophisticated
search tools. In dealing with such matters, legislatures typically seek input
from a variety of sources, including not only law enforcement agencies, but
also industry organizations, advocacy groups, academics, technical experts,
and the general public. 22 By contrast, the ability of courts to obtain expert
assistance and canvass the views of diverse stakeholders is much more
limited. 1
2 1
121 See Brown, supra note 94, at 36 1; Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 88, at 2179.
122 See, e.g., SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE LAWFUL ACCESS CONSULTATION (Nevis
Consulting Group ed., 2003).
123 See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 261-63
(2002); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
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Legislatures are also typically able to deal with new technologies more
quickly than courts. Most judicial rule-making is performed by appellate
courts, which usually encounter novel search technologies many years after
they are put into use, and even then only if relevant cases are tried and
appealed. 2 4 By this time, the factual record undergirding the rule-making
process may be outdated. 2 5  Legislation is also often overtaken by
technological developments, but here as well legislatures are better
equipped to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Unlike courts,
legislatures can adopt measures to ensure that statutory provisions are
periodically reviewed. Courts, in contrast, are constrained by stare
decisis, 126 and, in the realm of constitutional interpretation, courts also
impose constraints on legislative action. 1
27
All of this suggests that courts should be reluctant to usurp the
legislature's capacity to regulate the use of novel search technologies as it
sees fit. Public choice scholarship teaches us, however, that the legislative
process may be skewed in favor of motivated and powerful interest
groups. 128 Consequently, the interests of groups disproportionately harmed
by legislation may be systematically discounted. 129 It is often asserted, for
example, that the legislative process operates as a one-way ratchet in the
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 875-76 [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth
Amendment]; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003); William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing (Harvard Public Law
Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=886170 [hereinafter
Stuntz, Accountable Policing].
124 See Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 868-69.
125 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999).
126 See Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 871-73. Many of the enhanced
investigative powers enacted by Congress and Parliament in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were made subject to "sunset" clauses mandating expiry
after a certain period absent legislative renewal. See Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, §§ 202, 206, 209, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218,
220; Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 83.32 (1985).
127 See Stuntz, Accountable Policing, supra note 123, at 34-41.
128 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Steams ed., 1997).
129 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). As William
Stuntz has said, "Anytime the government does something that has concentrated costs but
diffused benefits, there is a danger that it will do too much-harming one voter to please ten
is generally thought to be a good deal from the point of view of politically accountable
decisionmakers." Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 88, at 2165.
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criminal sphere.130 According to this view, legislatures respond robustly to
demands for greater investigative powers and harsher sanctions from police,
prosecutors, victims, and the crime-fearing public, while ignoring calls
from defense lawyers, civil libertarians, and academics for greater police
regulation and punitive restraint.131
Some commentators have argued that this may often be true of search
and seizure laws, which as we have seen sometimes impose
disproportionate costs on politically marginal groups (such as certain racial
and ethnic minorities). 132 It would be a mistake to assume, however, that
legislatures are always incapable of tempering demands for intrusive search
and surveillance powers. 133  When a surveillance technique threatens to
impose substantial costs on a broad or politically powerful segment of the
population, the legislature will often be pressured to regulate it.134 Indeed,
in most cases Congress has regulated new search technologies long before
the courts have encountered them. 135  And in cases where the Supreme
Court has found that a technology does not invade a reasonable expectation
of privacy, Congress has often intervened to regulate it. For example, after
the Court held that pen registers were not Fourth Amendment searches,
136
Congress responded with legislation prohibiting their use without a court
130 See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994); Donald A. Dripps,
Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't
Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079
(1993); Charles Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83-85 (1995). But see Stuntz, Accountable Policing, supra
note 123, at 19 ("Contrary to the conventional wisdom, criminal suspects are a powerful
interest group.").
131 See KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 553-56 (2001).
132 See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 93-104; see also MICHAEL H. TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
133 See generally Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 839-58 (noting that
Congress, and not the courts, has taken the lead in providing privacy in the face of novel
search technologies); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REv. 219, 254-60 (2004) (arguing that
legislators can sometimes be motivated to enact criminal defendant-friendly legislation).
134 See Stuntz, Accountable Policing, supra note 123, at 19, 53. Stuntz also points out
that there is a considerable body of legislation designed to redress the kinds of police abuses
(such as racial profiling) that are disproportionately visited on minorities. Id. at 22-24; see
also Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 88, at 2165-66.
135 See Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 870-82; Stuntz, Accountable
Policing, supra note 123, at 21-22.
136 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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order.137 Similarly, after lower courts found no reasonable expectation of
privacy in cordless telephone conversations, 138 Congress enacted provisions
protecting them. 139  And after the Supreme Court concluded that bank
records attract no reasonable expectation of privacy, 140 Congress prohibited
authorities from obtaining them without a subpoena, warrant, or formal
written request providing grounds for the search.
141
In the pre-Charter era, the Canadian Parliament was similarly proactive
in protecting privacy against intrusive surveillance technologies. 142 This
effort lagged somewhat in the first two decades after the passage of the
Charter, when Parliament was forced to respond to a series of assertive § 8
decisions by the Supreme Court. 143 Yet even during this period, Parliament
137 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121-27 (2000). Law
enforcement agencies may obtain such an order, however, merely by showing that the
"information likely to be obtained.., is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id.
§§ 3122(b)(2), 3123(a). This standard is likely lower than reasonable suspicion. See JAMES
A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: COMMENTARIES AND
STATUTES 121 (2003/2004 ed.). Courts may not exclude evidence, moreover, on the basis
that it was obtained in violation of this legislation. See United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d
1249 (11th Cir. 1991) (courts should not imply a suppression remedy unless a statute
specifically refers to the exclusionary rule); Kerr, Internet Surveillance, supra note 44, at
632.
138 See United States v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 104-06 (4th Cir. 1995); United States. v.
Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 177-81 (5th Cir. 1995); Tyler v. Behrodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir.
1989).
139 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
§ 202(a), 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
140 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
141 Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402-3422; see U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1984). To obtain
banking records, the government must have "reason to believe that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry." See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3405, 3407, 3408. This
standard is lower than probable cause. See Hunt v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 520 F. Supp
580 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Again, evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is not
subject to suppression at trial. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(d) ("The remedies and sanctions
described in this chapter shall be the only authorized judicial remedies and sanctions for
violations of this chapter."); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 52 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that the only remedy under the RFPA is provided the in statute); United States v. Frazin, 780
F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
142 See Canada Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. 50 (1973-74) (prohibiting the
interception of private communications, providing procedure for obtaining wiretap warrants,
and prohibiting admission of evidence obtained in contravention of warrant requirements).
143 As discussed, in R. v. Duarte, the Court struck down what was then § 178.11 of the
Criminal Code, which exempted participant surveillance from the prohibition of warrantless
electronic surveillance. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.). The Criminal Code was subsequently
amended to permit warrantless participant surveillance in two circumstances: (1) as
protection for undercover agents (in which case any evidence obtained is inadmissible); and
(2) when police obtain a warrant based on reasonable and probable grounds. Canada
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took the lead over the courts in protecting privacy in a number of areas.
After two courts found that pen registers did not invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy, 44 Parliament authorized the issuance of "number
recorder" warrants on the basis of reasonable suspicion. 145 And after one
court determined that wireless telephone communications might not be
subject to the same statutory protections as land line calls,146 Parliament
passed legislation clarifying that most wireless calls are protected. 47
Courts should generally be reluctant, then, to preempt the legislature's
decision to regulate (or decline to regulate) novel surveillance techniques.
They should be especially deferential when dealing with sophisticated and
rapidly changing search technologies whose social costs are likely to be
distributed across a broad segment of society.148 Less deference may be
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 §§ 184.1, 184.2 (1985). Recall as well that in R. v. Wong,
the Court held that surreptitious, video-only surveillance (which the Criminal Code has
never prohibited) of a hotel room invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. [1990] 3
S.C.R. 36 (Can.). Parliament responded by enacting a provision allowing police to obtain
warrants to conduct video surveillance on reasonable and probable cause. Canada Criminal
Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 487.01. And in R. v. Wise, the Court concluded that the installation
and monitoring of a tracking device invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. [1992] 1
S.C.R. 527 (Can.). Parliament soon thereafter authorized the granting of tracking warrants
on the basis of reasonable suspicion. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 492.1.
144 See R. v. Sampson, [1983] 45 Nlfd. & P.E.I.R. 32 (Nfld. C.A.) (Can.); R. v. Fegan,
[1993] 13 O.R.3d 88 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
145 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 492.2. The provision defines a "number
recorder" as "any device that can be used to record or identify the telephone number or
location of the telephone from which a telephone call originates, or at which it is received or
is intended to be received." As mentioned supra note 48, at least two courts have since held
that the use of the reasonable suspicion standard in place of reasonable and probable grounds
violates § 8 of the Charter. See R. v. Nguyen, [2004] B.C.J. No. 249 (B.C. S.C.) (Can.); R.
v. Hackert, [1997] O.J. No. 6384 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.).
146 See R. v. Solomon, [1992] 77 C.C.C.3d 264 (Que. Mun. Ct.) (Can.) (holding that an
intercepted wireless telephone communication was not a "private communication" within the
meaning of Part VI of the Criminal Code, as the accused could not reasonably have expected
that his conversations would not be intercepted).
147 Section 183 of the Criminal Code now specifies that any radio-based telephone
communication that "is treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing
intelligible reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to
receive it" is a "private communication" subject to the same protections as land-line
telephone communications. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 183. Section 184.5
also makes it an offense to intercept radio-based telephone communications "maliciously or
for gain." Id. § 184.5
148 See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REv. 507, 555-56 (2005); Stuntz,
Local Policing, supra note 88, at 2166. This is not to say that where the social costs of a
privacy-invasive search technique are broadly distributed, legislatures will ineluctably
choose the optimal level of privacy protection. Like other decision-makers (including
judges), the rationality of legislators (and the constituents who elect them) is limited by a
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warranted when the costs of a technique are likely to be borne
disproportionately by "discrete and insular minorities" with little political
power.149 Concluding that a technique invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy (and is hence subject to privacy-protecting regulations) improves
the odds that its costs will be internalized by society as a whole. 50
IV. INFRARED CAMERA SEARCHES
To illustrate how economically-informed cost-benefit analysis can
improve the conventional reasonable expectation of privacy test, consider
the use of infrared cameras to detect indoor marijuana cultivation
operations. Recall that in Kyllo, the United States Supreme Court held that
residential infrared camera searches invade a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and that in Tessling, the Canadian Supreme Court came to the
number of factors, including incomplete and asymmetric information, bounded rationality,
and systemic psychological distortions. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 120, at 13, 48; Roger
G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation,
in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 120, at 325, 342-47. There is evidence
that cognitive, decisional, and informational limitations may lead people to prefer
suboptimal levels of privacy protection. While the risks of being a victim of crime are
typically straightforward, immediate, and highly salient, the risks of privacy invasions may
often be complex, cumulative, context dependent, and realized far into the future. See
Allesandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate
Gratification, 1 PROC. 6TH ANN. ACM CONF. ON ELECTRONIC CoM. 21, 23-24 (2004),
available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-acquisti/papers/privacy-gratification.pdf; Acquisti
& Grossklags, supra note 76, at 26-27; Brown, supra note 94, at 343. Judges are just as
likely, however, to suffer from these limitations as legislators.
149 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we
enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." (citations omitted)); see also Wasserstrom
& Seidman, supra note 10, at 95 ("[W]hen the privacy costs of law enforcement are spread
more widely, and there is a reduced risk that the politically less powerful are being forced to
bear disproportionate privacy losses, the courts often have allowed searches and seizures
without prior judicial supervision or particularized suspicion.").
150 This assumes that economically privileged, unelected judges are better attuned to the
problem of law enforcement discrimination than legislators. This assumption has been
questioned. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 10, at 100. However, on account of
their extensive experience with police-citizen encounters and relative insulation from
majoritarian pressures, judges may be able to discern differential impacts on privacy that are
likely to be ignored or discounted by legislators. See William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975).
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opposite conclusion.1 51  The Tessling Court described the capabilities of
infrared cameras as follows:
FLIR 152 technology records images of thermal energy or heat radiating from a
building. Once a baseline is calibrated, cooler areas show up as dark, and warmer
areas are lighter. FLIR imaging cannot, at this stage of its development, determine the
nature of the source of heat within the building. It cannot distinguish between heat
diffused over an external wall that came originally from a sauna or a pottery kiln, or
between heat that originated in an overheated toaster or heat from a halide lamp. In
short, the FLIR camera cannot "see" through the external surfaces of a building.
However, the substantial amounts of heat generated by marijuana growing operations
must eventually escape from the building. The FLIR camera creates an image of the
distribution of escaping heat at a level of detail not discernible by the naked eye. A
FLIR image, put together with other information, can help the police get reasonable
and probable grounds to believe that a marijuana growing operation is in residence.
153
Though both courts invoked the public exposure and intimacy
doctrines, neither doctrine proved particularly helpful. Justice Scalia began
his majority decision in Kyllo by noting that the visual inspection of a
dwelling (from any publicly accessible vantage point) is not a search. 54 He
quickly concluded, however, that infrared searches differ from "naked eye
surveillance" because they allow police to obtain "information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.""
155
Scalia found, in other words, that Kyllo did not voluntarily expose the heat
radiating from his home to public observation.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Kyllo dissenters, took a different
approach. In his view, infrared cameras do not give police direct access to
private information; rather, they merely help them to infer what is going on
151 United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432
(Can.). Note that these results do not fit the general pattern of the respective Courts' recent
search and seizure decisions. The United States Supreme Court has generally been more
accommodating of law enforcement interests than its Canadian counterpart. See supra notes
31-75 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that each of the two camps in Kyllo
consisted of a curious amalgam of conservatives and liberals. The Justices in the majority
were Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Kennedy dissented. Id.
152 "FLIR" stands for "Forward Looking Infra-Red." See Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 2.
153 Id. 5 (citation omitted). The device used in Kyllo was described as a
"non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat
being radiated from the outside of the house"; it "did not show any people or activity within the
walls of the structure"; "the device used cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal
conversations or human activities"; and "no intimate details of the home were observed."
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30 (quoting from the evidentiary findings of the district court).
114 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-33.
5 Id. at 33-34 (internal citation omitted).
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inside residences from "information in the public domain."' 156 Expressly
applying the public exposure doctrine, he concluded that infrared camera
searches could not be constitutionally distinguished from naked eye
observations of heat emanations, as when someone notices that "one part of
a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example,
rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces."'
' 57
In Tessling, the Supreme Court of Canada treated the public exposure
doctrine with more ambivalence. In assessing whether Tessling had a
subjective expectation of privacy in his home's thermal profile, Justice
Binnie asserted that "allowing" heat to escape does not count as a knowing
or voluntary exposure.'5 8 In determining the objective reasonableness of
any expectation of privacy, however, he noted that heat loss from external
walls is "obvious to even the most casual observer,"' 159 and while an
infrared camera reveals more detail than is apparent to the naked eye, it
nonetheless "records only information exposed to the public."'
' 60
There is no way to determine which of the forgoing approaches is
correct. The dissipation of thermal energy is inevitable, 161 and in many
circumstances, differential heat production will be visually discernable. It
is also true that infrared imaging produces a more detailed picture of heat
distribution than is apparent in the visible part of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Attempting to categorize the information revealed by infrared
searches as "public" or "private" or emanating from a home's "exterior" or
"interior" is a fruitless endeavor.
It is perhaps for this reason that the Tessling majority and the Kyllo
dissent focused on the nature of the information obtained by infrared
searches, concluding that they revealed only non-intimate information.
62
This argument has some merit. The images in Kyllo and Tessling allowed
police to make only general inferences about the nature of the activities
taking place inside the home. Justice Scalia had a point, however, when he
stated that "in the home ... all details are intimate details.' ' 63  He
questioned whether it would be possible to articulate a standard "specifying
156 Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15' Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R 39-41.
159 Id. 46.
160 Id. 47.
161 See Pennsylvania v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 904-05 (Pa. 1999) ("The laws of
thermodynamics dictate that no matter how much one insulates, heat will still escape.").
162 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42-46, 50-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R
59-62.
63 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
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which home activities are 'intimate' and which are not. ' ' 16 4 Assessments of
intimacy vary widely depending on subjective preferences, context, and the
extent to which information from disparate sources is compiled and
aggregated. The infrared images produced in Kyllo and Tessling were
crude, but combined with other information, they could nonetheless
generate probabilistic inferences about a number of non-criminal activities
that some people would prefer to keep private.1 65 While it can be argued
that the information uncovered by infrared cameras is not especially
sensitive, ultimately the intimacy doctrine is only marginally more helpful
than the public exposure doctrine in deciding whether the technology
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.
A. PRIVACY COSTS
Economic cost-benefit analysis promises to be more helpful in making
this determination. Consider first the social costs that would ensue if
infrared searches were held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.
When a court finds such an expectation, it subjects the search technique to
constitutional regulation, usually by requiring police to obtain a probable
cause warrant. Even if we assume that police could obtain infrared
warrants on a lesser standard (such as reasonable suspicion), the costs
would be substantial. Police would be forced to rely on more expensive
and riskier investigative methods (such as undercover operations) either as
substitutes for infrared searches or to provide evidentiary foundations for
warrant applications.166  Higher costs mean less enforcement and less
deterrence.
'64 Id. at 38-39.
165 Justice Scalia asserted, for example, that the infrared technology used in Kyllo may
have permitted police to determine "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath." Id. at 38; see also United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1501
(10th Cir. 1995) ("While the heat lost by a building is data of some limited value, the true
worth of the device-the very reason that the government turned the imager on the home of
the Defendants-is predicated upon the translation of these thermal records into intelligible
(albeit speculative) information about the activities that generate the observed heat."),
vacated and decided on other grounds, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
166 This remains true even if it is assumed that infrared images must usually be
supplemented by corroborating evidence to establish probable cause to conduct physical
searches. See Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 456 ("[A]t present no warrant could ever properly
be granted solely on the basis of a FLIR image."). Thus, prohibiting infrared searches in the




Our willingness to bear these costs depends on the magnitude of the
benefits that a warrant requirement would produce. In the absence of legal
privacy protections, people may either avoid productive activities or defend
their privacy by other means. Unrestricted infrared searches are unlikely to
produce either avoidance or defensive costs. As discussed, even crude
infrared images may permit probabilistic inferences about non-criminal
residential activity, and some may not want police to have unrestricted
access to this information. But for people who are not growing marijuana,
knowing that police might be monitoring heat escaping from their homes is
unlikely to prompt any behavioral changes, let alone chill participation in
socially valuable discourse or activity. The fact that electricity
consumption records have been freely available to police for years does not
appear to have prompted people to modify their residential activities.
161
Similarly, the widespread use of infrared cameras is not likely to cause law-
abiding individuals to install better insulation or find other means of
limiting the escape of heat from their homes.
The next question is whether regulating infrared searches is likely to
prevent suboptimal enforcement expenditures. At first blush, the marijuana
prohibition might appear to be the kind of inefficient law that privacy rights
should aim to thwart. 168 The economic case for legalizing marijuana (and
perhaps other illicit drugs) is strong. 69 There is considerable evidence that
the costs of enforcement vastly outweigh the harms of consumption.170 But
even if this is correct, it does not follow that privacy law should be used to
hamper the ability of police to detect producers. As long as marijuana
trafficking remains illegal, a substantial portion of its profits will flow to
people involved in broader criminal enterprises.17 1 Restricting infrared
searches would diminish the risk of detection, thereby lowering the costs of
167 See R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (Can.).
168 There is a hint of this reasoning in the appeals court's decision in Tessling. See R. v.
Tessling, [20031 171 C.C.C.3d 361, 382-83 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) ("[T]here has been public,
judicial, and political recognition that marijuana is at the lower end of the hierarchy of
harmful drugs."), rev'd, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (Can.).
169 See Gary S. Becker et al., The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs, 114 J.
POL. ECON. 38 (2006); Cooter & Ulen, supra note 80, at 479-84 (reviewing theoretical and
empirical evidence demonstrating the inefficiency of the "war on drugs").
70 See, e.g., COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS, CANNABIS, A
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF DRUGS (1972); see
also R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (Can.); R. v. Parker, [2000] 146 C.C.C.3d
193 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.).
171 See Paul J. Goldstein et al., Drug-Related Homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988, 38
CRIME & DELINQ. 459 (1992).
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entry into the trade and increasing revenues available to finance crimes that
do cause substantial social harm. It would also lead to an increase in
violence and other criminal activity associated with competition between
producers. 172 If the marijuana prohibition is a bad law, then we should
press for its reform or abolition-not use privacy law to promote the growth
of an illicit market. 
173
The discretionary use of infrared searches is also unlikely to encourage
discriminatory profiling. Discriminatory profiling is most likely to occur
when police can readily observe the profiled characteristic (such as race)
and use it as a proxy for criminality, such as during street and vehicle stops,
airport security checks, or border crossings. 174 Police using infrared
cameras, in contrast, are less likely to be aware of the suspect's race or
ethnicity. 175 The immediate targets of the searches, after all, are buildings,
not people. Further, unlike detentions and physical searches of pedestrians,
drivers, and air travelers, infrared searches are unlikely to cause innocent
suspects to feel inconvenienced, embarrassed, or stigmatized (feelings that
often generate a profound sense of unfairness among the innocent targets of
profiling). Indeed, in most cases the innocent subjects of infrared searches
will never become aware that they have been searched.
C. DECISION-MAKING ERROR
Even if the forgoing analysis underestimates the costs or overestimates
the benefits of unregulated infrared searches, we should still prefer the
result in Tessling to that in Kyllo. Like many other novel search
technologies, the uses and capabilities of infrared imaging are changing
rapidly. 76 These are precisely the circumstances in which courts should be
172 See Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-
Selling Gang's Finances, 115 Q. J. ECON. 755 (2000).
173 The former Canadian government's proposed legislation decriminalizing the
possession of small quantities of marijuana suggests that Parliament may be becoming more
amenable to such reform. See An Act to amend the Contraventions Act and the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, Bill C-17,
38th Pan., (1st Sess. 2004) (Can.).
174 See sources cited supra note 100.
175 In cases where police do target members of a minority group in marijuana
investigations, evidence of discrimination will often be readily apparent. In R. v. Nguyen,
for example, the court found that a police officer engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling
when he obtained from a local land registry office a list containing only the names of
property owners with Vietnamese surnames. [2006] O.J. No. 272 29-30 (Ont. S.C.) (Can.).
176 See Jeffrey P. Campisi, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The
Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REv. 241, 270-75 (2001) (discussing the
state of current thermal imaging technology and future developments); George M. Dery,
Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging Lie Detection Technology,
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reluctant to preempt the legislature's ability to craft (and adjust) a nuanced
and flexible regulatory scheme.
The majority opinion in Kyllo illustrates the drawbacks of judicial
interventionism in the realm of high technology. Anxious to set out a firm,
bright-line rule capable of anticipating future technological
developments, 177 Justice Scalia proclaimed that "obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use."'78 The
"general public use" criterion, however, is both vague and normatively
troubling. 179 Since Kyllo was decided, infrared cameras have become more
affordable, portable, and user-friendly; they are currently used in a wide
variety of law enforcement, immigration, military, and civilian applications,
including construction, manufacturing, testing, and inspection.18  How are
police, prosecutors, and courts to determine when infrared cameras are so
ubiquitous as to be in "general public use"? And if the courts eventually
decide that they are, would this mean that infrared cameras could never
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if they become capable of
capturing detailed images of residential life?
If infrared imaging advances to this point, and if its use by the police
threatens to generate significant avoidance or defensive costs, legislatures
can intervene and regulate it. As infrared searches have the potential to
impact a broad segment of society, the issue is best left to the legislative
process. Technology enabling police to "see" what is going on inside a
person's home is likely to prompt strong political opposition. In these
circumstances, legislatures are more likely to achieve an optimal balance of
privacy and security than the courts.1
81
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2004) (discussing the use of infrared cameras to detect facial blood
flow patterns consistent with deception).
177 See United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) ("While the technology used in the
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.").
178 Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
179 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Advanced Infrared Resources, http://www.infraredthermography.com/
applicat.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2007); FLIR, http://www.flir.com (last visited Apr. 21,
2007).
181 For example, in an effort to minimize the intrusiveness of infrared searches,
legislation could set out a list of "approved" infrared cameras, with detailed specifications
for their use, as has been done in the context of blood alcohol screening and measuring
devices. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 254 (1985).
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V. LOCATION TRACKING
A similar analysis can be performed with respect to a very different
surveillance technology: location tracking devices. Early iterations of this
technology were considered in Knotts,182 Karo, g3 and Wise. 184 Recall that
in Knotts and Karo, the United States Supreme Court held that tracking
suspects with surreptitiously planted radio transmitters (beepers) did not
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, as long as the transmitters did
not allow police to monitor constitutionally protected locations, such as
residences.' 85 In Wise, in contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded
that such tracking of a suspect's vehicle over public roads infringed on a
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit only in a "minimally intrusive"
manner. 186
By today's standards, the technology used in these cases was
rudimentary. The Court described the beeper used in Wise as follows:
The device consisted of a low power radio transmitter. From the strength of the
signal, it was possible to determine the general location of the object to which the
beeper had been fixed. By moving in the direction of the transmitter and adjusting the
"RF gain control", the location could be more precisely determined. The device used
in this case was not capable of indicating if the object being tracked was to the right,
left, front or back of the receiver of the signal.
The evidence in this case was that the device was used intermittently as a back-up for
visual surveillance of the appellant's car ... particularly to attempt to locate the
vehicle when visual surveillance failed. Since the device was not capable of
pinpointing the vehicle with any degree of precision, physical surveillance was always
required to fix its proximate position. 187
Tracking devices are now much more powerful and precise. Two
sophisticated technologies are already in widespread use: the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and wireless telephone networks.'8 8  Like
182 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
183 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
184 R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (Can.).
185 See discussion supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
186 Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 538.
'87 Id. at 534-35. The capabilities of the devices used in Knotts and Karo were roughly
similar. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.I; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. In both cases, a beeper was
used as a supplement to, and not a complete substitute for, traditional physical surveillance.
188 There are a number of other widely-used technologies that allow police to determine
suspects' locations, including public transit passes and toll road transponders, both of which
record the time and the pass holders' identity at points of ingress and egress. Unlike GPS
and wireless telephone networks, however, these technologies are not capable of tracking
suspects' movements on a continuous basis. See generally Brendan I. Koerner, Your
Cellphone Is a Homing Device, LEGAL AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2003, at 30, available at
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traditional beepers, these technologies use radio waves to establish a
connection between devices at unknown locations and devices at known
locations. The newer technologies, however, have two critical advantages
over beepers. Unlike a beeper, which must remain within a certain distance
of its tracking receiver, GPS and wireless phone tracking devices are linked
to an extensive, permanent network of transceivers. This allows police to
track suspects from a remote, stationary location, thus eliminating the need
for mobile, physical surveillance. 189  Second, because GPS devices and
wireless phones can send data to and receive data from multiple network
nodes simultaneously, the suspect's precise location can be determined
mathematically. 190 As noted in Wise, a beeper's location can only be
inferred imprecisely by gauging the strength of its signal.191
The GPS network consists of at least two dozen satellites, which are
owned by the United States government and were initially used for
exclusively military purposes and are now freely available for a variety of
civilian navigational uses.192 GPS devices can determine location with a
great deal of precision. Depending on the equipment used, distances
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2003/feature-koemer-julaugO3.msp. Video
monitoring systems are capable of continuous surveillance, so long as suspects' movements
occur within the range of the camera network. See generally Rene M. Pomerance,
Redefining Privacy in the Face of New Technologies: Data Mining and the Threat to the
"Inviolate Personality," 9 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273 (2005), Justice Gerard La Forest,
Address to George Radwanski, Privacy Comm'r of Can., Opinion: Video Surveillance (Apr.
5, 2002), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/opinion-020410_e.asp.
189 See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. 2003).
190 Specifically, a GPS device determines its location by measuring the time it takes for
radio signals to travel to the device from at least four different satellites. Location can then
be derived through the processes of trilateration or multilateration. See AHMED EL-
RABBANY, INTRODUCTION TO GPS: THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 1-2, 8-9 (2002). The
location of a non-GPS equipped wireless phone can be calculated in a similar fashion, using
the time differences obtained from multiple base stations. It can also be determined using
triangulation by measuring the angles of the signals received by two or more base stations.
See Recent Development, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-09 (2004)
[hereinafter Who Knows Where You've Been?]. Yet another technique, known as
"fingerprinting," permits location to be pinpointed by analyzing the distortion patterns
corresponding to differing locations in a single base station's receiving range. See David J.
Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless Communication,
8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 4-5 (2003).
'9' R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 534-35 (Can.).
192 See generally ELLIOT D. KAPLAN, UNDERSTANDING GPS: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS (1996). The government first granted civilians access to GPS in 1983. See
April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting
the Supreme Court's Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 661, 666 (2005).
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covered, and other variables, they can currently determine location
(longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few meters.' 93 The accuracy of
GPS tracking has improved steadily over the years, and further
improvement is expected. Police may either surreptitiously install GPS
receivers on suspects' vehicles or possessions 94 or obtain real-time or
historical data generated by commercial GPS devices, such as those
installed in vehicles and wireless phones. 195
Wireless telephones are also capable of being conscripted by police for
use as tracking devices, even when they are not equipped with GPS devices.
Whenever they are turned on, wireless (cell) phones automatically and
periodically communicate with a network of base and switching stations.
96
These communications, which are carried on a dedicated channel separate
from the voice and data communications sent or received by the phone's
user, connect the phone to the network and allow it to switch channels when
it moves from one cell area to another.' 97  The accuracy of non-GPS
wireless phone tracking varies widely, depending on a number of factors,
including the sophistication of the technology and the number of stations
within range of the phone. Many contemporary systems can determine
location (longitude and latitude) to within fifty meters, 98 and future systems
will undoubtedly be even more precise.1 99 As with GPS tracking, police
193 One of the leading manufacturers of commercial GPS receivers boasts that its devices
are accurate to within fifteen meters, on average. Garmin: What is GPS?,
http://www.garmin.com/aboutGPS (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). GPS devices can also
determine an object's velocity (if it is in motion) and correlate its location with time. EL-
RABBANY, supra note 190, at 8-9, 18-19.
194 See, e.g., Stacy Finz & Michael Taylor, Peterson Tracking Device Called Flawed,
Defense Wants Evidence Shut Out of Trial, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2004, at A17. A number
of companies sell GPS devices designed to be surreptitiously installed on vehicles. See
Covert GPS Vehicle Tracking Systems LLC, http://www.covert-gps-vehicle-tracking-
systems.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2007); Datalogger GPS & Cellular Tracking Products,
Spook Tech, http://www.spooktech.com/trackingeqmt/datalogger.shtml (last visited Apr. 21,
2007).
19 See EL-RABBANY, supra note 190, at 10.
196 Who Knows Where You've Been?, supra note 190, at 309; Matt Richtel, Live Tracking
of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2005, at Al.
197 In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750-51 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
198 The 911 emergency response system is one example such a system. See How 911
Works, BellSouth, http://contact.bellsouth.com/email/bbs/phase2/how911works.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2007).
199 The improvement of non-GPS wireless telephone location technology, as well as the
increasing use of GPS in wireless phones, has been encouraged by legislation mandating
compliance with standards for "wireless 911" systems, which automatically determine the
location of people making emergency calls from wireless phones. See Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 615 (2000); In re Application
2007]
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for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755 ("This inexorable combination of market and
regulatory stimuli ensures that cell phone tracking will become more precise with each
passing year."); FCC 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006); Darren Handler, An Island of
Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-9 (2005); Phillips, supra note 190, at 3-5.
The United States Congress has also required wireless service providers to facilitate law
enforcement by ensuring that their systems can record the location of the antenna tower
connected to a telephone at the beginning and end of each call. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002; U.S.
Telecom Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 227 F.3d 450, 462-64 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Third
Report & Order, In the Matter of Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14
F.C.C. Rec. 16794 (Aug. 31, 1999) [hereinafter Third Report & Order]. Notably, however,
the Federal Communications Commission rejected the argument that providers must also be
able to pinpoint the phone's location throughout a call's duration. See Third Report &
Order, 14 F.C.C. Rec. at 16816 46.
To date, Canadian regulators have not imposed specific requirements for wireless 911
location tracking, other than to require new providers to meet the capacities of established
ones. See Gordon Gow, Public Safety Telecommunications in Canada: Regulatory
Intervention in the Development of Wireless E9-1-1, 30 CAN. J. COMM. 65 (2004).
Consequently, Canada has lagged behind the United States in the development of wireless
911 systems. While municipal governments and wireless and wireline service providers
have voluntarily cooperated to develop systems, few providers are currently able to transmit
precise location information to emergency operators. See COLIN J. BENNETT & LORI CROWE,
REPORT TO THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, LOCATION BASED SERVICES AND THE
SURVEILLANCE OF MOBILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY RISKS IN CANADA 9-14 (2005),
available at http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/pdf/LBSFINAL.pdf.
For law enforcement purposes, Canadian wireless service providers are required to be
capable of recording the most accurate location information available to them. This
obligation stems from unpublished licensing conditions, see Solicitor General's Enforcement
Standards for Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (Rev. Nov. 95) (Can.), imposed
by Ministerial fiat pursuant to § 5 of the Canada Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch.
R 2. See INDUS. CAN., SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY:
SPECTRUM LICENSING POLICY FOR CELLULAR AND INCUMBENT PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
SERVICES (PCS) 10-11 (2003), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/insmt-
gst.nsf/vwapj/pcspolicy-decl6_e final.pdf/$FILE/pcspolicy-decl6 e final.pdf; RICHARD-
PHILIPPE MARTEL, OFF. OF THE PRIVACY COMM'R OF CAN., PRIVACY ON THE AIR (1998),
available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/archive/02 05_a_981203_e.asp?V=Print#
Wireless%20Mobile%2OCommunication%2OTechnologies%2OReveal%2OWhere%2OWe%
20Go.
Improvements in wireless telephone tracking are also being spurred by commercial
marketing strategies, including the placement of advertising and other content tied to profiles
and real-time locations on consumers' phones. See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from
All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third-
Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 382-84 (2006);
Phillips, supra note 190, at 12; Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls?
Call Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 381, 381-82
(2003). In the United States, however, wireless carriers may not provide personally
identifiable location information to commercial third parties in the absence of customers'
explicit consent. See Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C.
§ 222(0.
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may obtain wireless telephone location data in real time 200 or from historical
records maintained by service providers.2 1 They may also use commercial
wireless networks to track devices surreptitiously placed on vehicles or
other objects.20 2
The question, then, is whether courts should find that these "second
generation" radio tracking systems invade a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As in the case of infrared searches, the conventional, morally
grounded approach is not particularly helpful. Consider first the public
exposure doctrine. By definition, people who venture into public spaces
(such as streets and highways) voluntarily subject their movements and
behaviors to observation. It can be argued that it is unreasonable to expect
one's public activities to remain private. Indeed, at least one court has
relied on this argument in concluding that cell phone tracking does not
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.20 3
As many commentators have pointed out, however, the public
exposure doctrine fails to account for the fact that electronic tracking
threatens the sense of anonymity that people often enjoy in public spaces.
2°4
While we necessarily take the risk that our public behavior will be observed
by others, these observations are typically sporadic and fleeting. As I
discuss in more detail below, GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems
allow authorities to surreptitiously monitor and record people's movements
in a systematic and detailed manner over an indefinite period of time. This
kind of intensive surveillance is not analogous to the passing observations
of strangers. Applying the public exposure doctrine to modem tracking
technologies may thus fail to confer a normatively attractive degree of
privacy.
The intimacy doctrine is similarly unhelpful. People's public
movements typically reveal only mundane information about them. Of
course, this is not always true. Many people would not want it known that
200 Investigators seeking prospective wireless telephone location data usually obtain it
from service providers; however, they may also have the ability to gather it directly. See In
re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 44-45 (2005 ed.)).
201 See, e.g., id. at 748-49.
202 See id. at 755 (citing Robert Stabe, Electronic Surveillance-Non-Wiretap § 3.31, in
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTIONS).
203 See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950-52 (6th Cir. 2004).
204 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1371-74 (2004); Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The
Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 575-76 (1998); Otterberg, supra note
192, at 685-86; Pomerance, supra note 188, at 291.
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they had visited a psychiatric institution, a gay bar, an adult video store, an
extramarital lover's home, or a political or religious meeting. Arguably,
using location tracking technologies to obtain this kind of information
invades a reasonable expectation of privacy because it relates to a
"biographical core of personal information" revealing "intimate details" of
"lifestyle or private decisions.
2°5
The problem with this argument, however, is that while intimate
personal information may be obtained by sophisticated tracking
technologies, it may also be obtained by unsophisticated, conventional
surveillance. No reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered when the
police discover extremely sensitive personal information simply by
observing a suspect in public spaces. Yet it is reasonable to argue, as I
elaborate in detail below, that electronic tracking should not be permitted
without a warrant. Measuring the intimacy of the information that tracking
technologies reveal, in other words, is of little assistance in deciding
whether these technologies invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.20 6
A. PRIVACY COSTS
As in the case of infrared searches, cost-benefit analysis is more
helpful. Consider first the social costs associated with recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to tracking devices. Doing so
would cause policing to become more expensive, less effective, or both.
Contemporary technologies permit police to monitor suspects' movements
207 208with a great deal of precision, over a vast spatial expanse, and for very
long periods of time.20 9  The financial costs to police of using these
technologies, moreover, are relatively modest.2
205 R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (Can.).
206 See BENNETT & CROWE, supra note 199, at 36-37.
207 See supra notes 193 and 198 and accompanying text.
208 As its name suggests, the geographic reach of GPS tracking is global. In Canada and
the United States (as well as much of the rest of the world), wireless telephone networks are
increasingly extensive. Only the very least densely populated parts of North America are
exempt from coverage.
209 In the case of a surreptitiously planted GPS device, continuous surveillance is
possible for the length of its battery's life. One company boasts that the batteries in its
device may last up to thirty days. See TrimTracXS Internet GPS Car Tracking System-
Real Time GPS Tracking, http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/slimtrak-realtime-gps-
tracking-car-locator.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). If switched on, the GPS transceivers
installed by vehicle manufacturers can function for an indefinite period, though service
providers do not generally monitor the vehicle unless the subscriber initiates a service
request, the vehicle is involved in an accident, or the provider is compelled by a court order.
See, e.g., OnStar, OnStar Privacy Statement, http://www.onstar.com/us-english/jsp/
privacy-policy.jsp (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). Wireless phone monitoring is possible
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The most obvious substitute for prospective211 electronic tracking is
visual surveillance. If police are interested only in obtaining location
information, electronic tracking is far superior to visual surveillance.
Compared to visual surveillance, electronic tracking requires less
manpower, is more reliable (there is typically less danger of "losing" the
target), and carries a lower risk of detection. These advantages multiply
when police track the movements of several people at once. Without
electronic assistance, tracking multiple people would typically require a
substantial deployment of manpower. With electronic tracking, it could
require only a single officer manning a video monitor.
If the police want to do more than simply track a suspect's location
(for instance, if they also want to interdict a drug transaction), or if the
location information generated by electronic tracking is insufficiently
precise, they may still need to deploy officers on the ground to conduct
visual surveillance. In such cases, however, electronic tracking may still be
helpful. Supplementing visual surveillance with electronic tracking allows
police to use fewer officers and follow suspects from greater distances and
more discreet vantage points.
The social costs of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in
retrospective 2 12 electronic tracking are even greater than for prospective
tracking, as there is no ready "low tech" substitute for retrospectively
tracking a suspect's movements. Retrospective location information is
most commonly obtained from wireless telephone service providers. A
suspect's whereabouts at a given time in the past can sometimes be
determined by other means, such as questioning the suspect or other people
or obtaining credit card, banking, or other transactional records.
Questioning may tip off the suspect, however, and result in the loss or
destruction of evidence. More importantly, none of these methods provides
the kind of continuous, historical record of the suspect's movements
whenever the device is turned on.
210 The costs associated with electronic tracking depend on a variety of factors, including
the sophistication of the technology and whether police use their own systems or co-opt
those of commercial service providers. As discussed in the text below, in most
circumstances these costs are very likely to be significantly lower than those associated with
analogous forms of surveillance.
211 By "prospective" tracking, I mean situations where police target suspects for
surveillance and then capture location information from that time forward. Police may either
track suspects in real-time or analyze location data at any time after it has been recorded.
212 By "retrospective" tracking, I mean situations where police obtain location
information for a period during which they had not tracked a suspect's location.
Retrospective location information thus always derives from either records kept by third
parties or less commonly, suspects themselves (as in the case of information inputted by
suspects into their own GPS devices).
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available from wireless providers.21 3 If retrospective location tracking is
held to invade a reasonable expectation of privacy, police lacking grounds
to obtain a warrant would have to resort to much more costly, risky, and
intrusive methods, such as undercover questioning.214
B. PRIVACY BENEFITS
Would the widespread use of location tracking technologies create
substantial avoidance or defensive costs? While it is difficult to be
definitive, the answer is most likely "yes." As mentioned, people who
venture out into public spaces subject themselves to observation by others,
including police. People take this into account, of course, often behaving
differently in public than they would in private.2" 5
The chilling effects of this kind of observation are limited, however.
While subject to observation, in most public spaces we enjoy anonymity.
Others may see us doing something stigmatizing, but if they do not know
who we are, this information is unlikely to be used against us. This
anonymity frees people, as Melvin Gutterman has put it, to "merge into the
'situational landscape.' 216 Contemporary electronic tracking technologies
threaten this freedom. Police could monitor an area for active transceivers
(such as those embedded in wireless telephones or GPS-equipped vehicles),
and if a person's location or movements attracted their attention for some
reason, his identity could be determined by cross-referencing the
transceiver's identification number with subscriber databases.
As discussed, public scrutiny is also typically brief and episodic. Our
public behavior may be observed, but any one observer will generally only
obtain a small fragment of information about us. If our activities are
subject to prolonged, unwanted observation, we can usually take steps to
preserve our privacy. Surreptitious visual observation is difficult, and in
213 Wireless providers currently keep records (for varying lengths of time) of subscribers'
locations that are accurate to within approximately three hundred yards. See Richtel, supra
note 196. European Union member states recently agreed to enact legislation requiring
telecommunications service providers to retain records of telephone and Internet
communications envelope data (including location data) for six to twenty-four months. See
Parliament & Council Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 O.J. (L105), 54 (E.C.). To date, there
have not been any concrete proposals to enact similar legislation in the United States or
Canada.
214 The effectiveness of GPS and wireless telephone tracking, it should be noted, may be
blunted by defensive measures. Criminals may switch off GPS chips in their cell phones,
inspect possessions for planted tracking devices, use anonymous wireless phone services, or
conduct business in places beyond the range of tracking systems. These measures impose
costs, however, and may thereby diminish the rate of criminal activity.
215 See Stigler, supra note 14, at 627.
216 Gutterman, supra note 24, at 706.
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most cases, people can confront or elude their observer. With GPS and
wireless telephone tracking, in contrast, people generally do not know
whether they are being monitored. These systems are also able to
continuously track people's movements over both an extensive geographic
space and lengthy period of time. This kind of surveillance may reveal
patterns, associations, and activities that would not be apparent to casual
observers.217
Further, even when we observe non-anonymous, stigmatizing public
behavior (for example, seeing a neighbor entering an adult video store), the
person observed may be able to credibly deny the transgression to others.21 8
Location tracking technologies, however, can generate reliable, permanent
records, which dramatically diminish people's ability to successfully
challenge harmful accusations.
Lastly, for most non-criminals, the risk of being subjected to
prolonged visual surveillance by police is highly remote. Police resources
are limited, and they are thus unlikely to monitor people who are not
strongly suspected of criminal activity.219  But as I have discussed,
contemporary tracking systems can inexpensively and continuously monitor
many subjects over an extensive geographic space. This could enable
efficient monitoring of people who are only very weakly suspected of
criminal activity. Police could use GPS or wireless telephone systems, for
example, to track the movements of anyone carrying a transceiver in a
"high crime" area or in the proximity of a suspected criminal or terrorist.
The non-anonymous, continuous, surreptitious, geographically and
temporally extensive, reliable, and inexpensive character of GPS and
wireless telephone tracking has the potential, therefore, to induce a much
greater chill on productive behavior than visual observation. If there is a
realistic possibility that police may monitor and record visitations to
psychiatric clinics, AIDS testing centers, needle exchanges, women's
shelters, mosques, and the like, then some people who would otherwise
have engaged in socially beneficial activities in these places will not do
217 See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 262 (Wash. 2003); Otterberg, supra note 192, at
696-98; see also Blitz, supra note 204, at 1409-10; Nissenbaum, supra note 204, at 576-77.
218 See R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, 51 (Can.) ("[I]f people in society come to
believe [that participant surveillance] is widespread and done without probable cause, they
may begin to fall silent on many occasions when previously they would have felt free to
speak, confident in the belief that they could challenge the credibility or memory of the
trusted colleague who would betray them." (citing Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d
354, 365 (Pa. 1987))).
219 See generally Otterberg, supra note 192, at 695 ("[T]hat the technology functions
completely without police presence makes it less limited by the practical constraints of
available human resources-and thus increases the potential for police abuse.").
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so.2 ° The avoidance costs associated with location tracking are potentially
quite substantial.
If the possibility of being monitored does not cause a person to avoid
valuable activities, that person may nevertheless expend resources to
prevent surveillance. Like criminals, non-criminals may attempt to thwart
electronic location tracking, especially when they are engaged in sensitive
activities. People may, for example, turn off their wireless phones or GPS
devices. In doing so, however, they would forgo the many benefits
conferred by these technologies. This must count as a significant cost of
failing to regulate electronic tracking.
We must next ask whether the judicial regulation of tracking
technologies is likely to prevent inefficient law enforcement expenditures.
Unlike infrared cameras, which are used to detect only one form of criminal
activity (indoor marijuana cultivation), electronic tracking is used in many
different types of investigations. Most of these involve crimes that
everyone agrees should be prohibited. Like wiretapping, however,
electronic tracking captures a great deal of information about innocent
activity. This creates a risk that police will use tracking technologies to
monitor non-criminal behavior. Before the widespread adoption of
statutory and constitutional protections against warrantless wiretapping, it
was not uncommon for authorities to use it to monitor and intimidate
members of unorthodox political groups. 221 There is also evidence that
public video surveillance systems are frequently used to observe and harass
minorities, women, and the poor.22 Of course, regulating surveillance
technologies cannot guarantee that they will not be misused; it does,
however, make it difficult to establish the kind of extensive surveillance
networks that facilitate widespread abuse.
220 GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems are being integrated with sophisticated
mapping systems that correlate location with virtually any other kind of information relevant
to police or emergency services personnel, such as crime statistics, business and housing
types, and vehicle traffic data. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 5.
221 See, e.g., COMM'N OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL
CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, CERTAIN R.C.M.P. ACTIVITIES AND THE QUESTION OF
GOVERNMENTAL KNOWLEDGE, THIRD REPORT/COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING
CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (1981); David Berry, The
First Amendment and Law Enforcement Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
207 (1982); Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REv.
883 (1984); Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties:
IV. Covert Government Surveillance, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1244 (1972).
222 See, e.g., CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY:
THE RISE OF CCTV 108-16 (1999); John Fiske, Surveilling the City: Whiteness, the Black
Man and Democratic Totalitarianism, 15 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y 67 (1998).
[Vol. 97
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
There are other tools available to minimize abuses of surveillance
technologies, 223 especially when it is clear that police have targeted subjects
for personal or political ends. Abuses are much more difficult to detect,
however, when minorities are targeted in legitimate criminal investigations.
As discussed, discriminatory profiling is most common in face-to-face
confrontations between police and minorities, as in street and vehicle stops.
These encounters often cause innocent suspects to feel embarrassed,
stigmatized, and unfairly treated.
As in the case of infrared searches, police engaged in electronic
tracking may not be aware of the race or ethnicity of the people being
monitored. The unique identifier of the monitored transceivers, however,
can be linked to users' identities, which can in turn be linked to databases
containing information on race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Police
can also supplement electronic tracking with visual surveillance, such as
when they judge an individual's movements to be suspicious. In such
cases, they may disproportionately select minorities for further investigation
or surveillance. So while electronic tracking is less likely to cause
discriminatory profiling than street or vehicle stops, it is more likely to do
so than infrared searches.
To summarize, failing to regulate GPS and wireless telephone tracking
is likely to impose substantial costs on society. Although it is difficult to
assess the magnitude of these costs, a strong argument can be made that
they probably outweigh the benefits of non-regulation. In any case, it is
clear that unregulated electronic tracking is much more costly than
unregulated infrared searching. Infrared searches reveal very little about
what is happening inside people's homes. They simply indicate that an
area, room, or building is substantially hotter than its surroundings.
Combined with other information, this may provide a simple and reliable
indicator that a structure is being used for a specific, criminal purpose. GPS
and wireless telephone tracking systems, in contrast, reveal a great deal of
information about non-criminal behavior. The disclosure of this
information to the state has the potential to lead to substantial avoidance
and defensive Costs224 as well as abusive and discriminatory policing.
C. DECISION-MAKING ERROR
The forgoing analysis has demonstrated that both the benefits and
costs associated with the unrestrained governmental use of location tracking
223 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3126 (2000); Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 § 195
(1985).
224 See Song, supra note 15, at 11.
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technologies are substantial. Which legal institution-legislatures or
courts-is best placed to decide which side of the ledger should prevail?
As in the case of infrared imaging, tracking technologies are changing
quickly. As discussed, contemporary GPS and wireless tracking systems
are much more powerful and precise than the primitive beepers considered
in Knotts, Karo, and Wise. And while it is clear that tracking devices will
continue to become more accurate and prevalent, their future development
cannot be predicted with anything approaching certainty. We do not know,
for example, how precise or unobtrusive they may eventually become.225
Nor can we predict all of the ways in which they will be used by individuals
and commercial service providers.226 Legislatures are better equipped to
respond to this kind of technological flux than courts. As discussed, they
have better access to technical information and are better placed to weigh
voters' preferences on privacy and security concerns.
It is distinctly possible, however, that giving legislatures exclusive
authority to regulate electronic tracking may disproportionately harm the
interests of minorities and waste law enforcement resources. If this is true,
and the private and social costs of these harms are not fully visible to
legislators, then there may be a representation reinforcement justification
for judicial intervention. As a result of their familiarity with the criminal
investigative process and their political independence, judges may be better
attuned to the disparate impacts of tracking technologies on minorities than
legislators.
If legislatures are better placed than courts to weigh the overall
benefits and costs of electronic tracking systems, but courts are more likely
to account for disproportionate harms to minorities, how should judges go
about determining the existence and extent of constitutional protection from
this kind of surveillance? There is no easy answer to this question. It is
sensible to begin, however, by examining how legislatures in the United
States and Canada have dealt with location tracking technologies.
To date, Congress has not imposed any substantive limitations on the
use of location tracking devices.227 Police are therefore free to use them
225 See, e.g., MOHINDER S. GREWAL ET AL., GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS, INERTIAL
NAVIGATION, AND INTEGRATION 71-73 (2001); Alan Cameron & Josh Landers, Taking Up
Position in Covert Surveillance, GPS WORLD, Aug. 2001, at 10; Michael Shaw,
Modernization of the Global Positioning System, GPS WORLD, Sept. 2000, at 36.
226 See, e.g., Steven Levy, A Future With Nowhere to Hide?, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004,
at 76; The Policeman on Your Dashboard, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, at 12; Something to
Watch Over You, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002, at 61.
227 However, Congress has restricted the use of location tracking in limited
circumstances. The wireless 911 statute specifies that location information collected during
911 calls can only be disclosed for emergency response purposes. See Wireless
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without either obtaining a warrant or establishing individualized
suspicion.228 Karo established, however, that a reasonable expectation of
privacy is triggered when the installation or monitoring of a tracking device
intrudes on a constitutionally-protected area, such as a private residence. In
such cases, police must obtain a warrant.229
Communication and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-81, § 5, 113 Stat. 1288
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 222(f)). Congress has also declared that the envelope data supplied
in response to pen/trap orders for wireless devices must not include location data, except
insofar as location can be determined from telephone numbers. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(2)(B).
228 The few courts that have considered the question of whether warrantless GPS or
wireless telephone tracking in public spaces violates the Fourth Amendment have all held
that it does not. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951-53 (6th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the use of cell site data to determine that a suspect had traveled from one
municipality to another did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records and Authorizing
the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that the issuance of a court order for retrospective cell site data associated with calls
did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy as location information was voluntarily
disclosed to the service provider); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle did not
invade a reasonable expectation of privacy). However, in State v. Jackson, the Washington
Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices violates the
state's constitution. 76 P.3d 217, 259-64 (Wash. 2003); see also United States v. Berry, 300
F. Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (D. Md. 2004) (noting the similarities and differences between
beepers and GPS tracking devices, but declining to decide whether monitoring of a GPS
device constituted search); People v. Lacey, No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4-8
(N.Y. Co. Ct. May 6, 2004) (concluding that installation of a GPS device constituted a
search under both federal and state constitutions, but denying application on the basis that
defendant lacked standing).
229 A provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act authorizes courts to grant
warrants for tracking devices that may move across district boundaries. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(a). The provision does not speak to the standard for authorizing such warrants. Most
courts have held that they must be issued under the authority of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes searches for evidence on the basis of probable
cause. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of
a Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] and [Sealed] and Prod.
of Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005); In re Application for Pen
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D.
Tex. 2005); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005),
reconsideration denied, 396 F. Supp, 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Application for an
Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (holding that the government may obtain the
location of the connecting antenna tower at the beginning and end of calls on the basis of the
"specific and articulable facts" standard set out in the Stored Communications Act (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2703). In United States v. Karo, the United States Supreme Court expressly
declined to comment on whether electronic tracking in constitutionally protected areas could
be justified by reasonable suspicion. 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984).
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A dramatic distinction exists in United States law, then, between
tracking in public spaces, which is unregulated, and tracking in private
spaces, which requires a warrant. Yet as we have seen, the use of GPS and
wireless telephone tracking in public spaces creates substantial social costs.
If the decision whether to regulate these technologies is left to Congress,
there is a risk that it will fail to act in a fully representative fashion. But if
judges intervene and recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is
a risk that they will overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of
regulation.
One way to mitigate both of these risks is for courts to recognize an
expectation of privacy, but require only that police justify tracking on the
basis of reasonable suspicion.230  This would significantly diminish the
potential for discriminatory profiling while maintaining law enforcement's
ability to track when they have only a moderate degree of suspicion. If
Congress determined that the social costs of GPS and wireless telephone
230 This standard is typically expressed in United States legislation and jurisprudence as
"specific and articulable facts." See, e.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2703(c)-(d) (authorizing government access to non-content subscriber records held by a
service provider); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (authorizing "stop and frisk"
searches). In Canada, the same standard is expressed variously as "articulable cause," see,
e.g., R. v. Simpson, [1993] 12 O.R.3d 182, 199, 200-04 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.), "reasonable
grounds to suspect" or "reasonable grounds to detain," see, e.g., R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
59 30, 33, 45 (Can.), or "reasonable suspicion." See, e.g., Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C.,
ch. C 46 §§ 492.1,492.2 (1985).
Courts could require governments to meet an even lower standard to justify GPS and
wireless telephone tracking. The standard of mere "relevance" to a criminal investigation is
used, for example, for a number of statutory search powers in the United States. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3407, 3408 (authorizing orders for financial records); 18 U.S.C. § 3123
(authorizing orders for pen registers and trap and trace devices). Recall, however, that these
provisions were enacted after the Supreme Court ruled that these searches did not invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. As long as the application
meets the formal requirements set out in the statute, courts must grant the authorization; they
have no authority to undertake an independent evaluation of the relevance of the information
sought. See United States. v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); In re United
States, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1994). Recall as well that while violations of
these statutes may result in criminal sanctions, exclusion of evidence is not a remedy. See
supra notes 137 and 141.
Even this very limited form of regulation would provide significant protection against
discriminatory profiling. Requiring police to go to court to obtain an authorization imposes
substantial logistical and economic restraints on their ability to arbitrarily select suspects for
investigation. It also makes it virtually impossible to engage in the kind of mass surveillance
of public spaces that GPS and wireless telephone tracking technologies make possible.
There would likely be little difference in practice, then, between the standards of reasonable
suspicion and relevance. Police are unlikely to invest the time and resources required to
obtain a court authorization unless they have at least a reasonable suspicion that tracking will
reveal evidence of criminal activity.
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tracking justified the use of the probable cause standard, it would be free to
legislate accordingly. Such a decision would be the product of a richer
information environment than is generally available to courts.
This is essentially the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Wise. However, that decision considered first generation tracking
technology. The question that Canadian courts now face is whether the
legislative response to Wise, which authorizes tracking warrants on
reasonable suspicion, complies with § 8 of the Charter when applied to GPS
and wireless telephone tracking. 231  As the argument presented above
suggests, the answer to this question should be "yes." While GPS and
wireless telephone tracking systems impose greater costs on society than
the beepers considered in Wise, they also have greater benefits. Requiring
warrants, even on the modest standard of reasonable suspicion, severely
limits the risk of widespread stereotyping and discrimination. With this
protection in place, the task of estimating the costs and benefits of tracking
technologies and choosing an appropriate scheme to regulate them is best
left to Parliament.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasonable expectation of privacy test does not require a radical
overhaul. Courts have cast it as a rough cost-benefit calculus and have
generally crafted reasonable compromises between privacy and crime
control interests. The test can undoubtedly be improved, however, and
economic analysis can play an important role in this process, especially as
231 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C 46 § 492.1. Another live question is whether
this provision authorizes the monitoring of tracking devices that were not installed by
government agents. The provision permits agents "to install, maintain, and remove a
tracking device in or on any thing, including a thing carried, used or worn by any
person... and to monitor, or to have monitored, a tracking device installed in or on any
thing." Id. "Tracking device" is defined as "any device that, when installed in or on any
thing, may be used to help ascertain, by electronic or other means, the location of any thing
or person." Id. While the first clause refers to the installation of the device by police, the
subsequent clauses use the verb "install" in the passive voice, implying that it may be
effected by non-state agents. See id. From a policy perspective, there would seem to be
little reason to differentiate between devices installed by police and those used by
commercial service providers. To date, there have been no reported decisions on either the
interpretation or constitutionality of § 492.1 in the context of GPS or wireless telephone
tracking. See generally R. v. Gerrard, No. CR-01-000176, CR-02-000154, 2003 W.C.B.J.
LEXIS 225 (Ont. S.C. Feb. 12, 2003) (Can.) (considering police use of the general
investigative warrant provision in § 487.01 of the Code (which requires reasonable and
probable grounds) to install and monitor a GPS tracking device); R. v. T. & T. Fisheries Inc.,
[2005] P.E.I.J. No. 74 (P.E.I. P.C.) (Can.) (analyzing a § 492.1 warrant used by police to
install and monitor a GPS tracking device).
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emerging technologies threaten the vitality of traditional conceptions of
privacy based on secrecy and intimacy.
The chief contribution of economics in this area is to provide a more
rigorous and productive alternative to the moral conception of privacy that
courts have conventionally relied on in making reasonable expectation of
privacy decisions. Unlike the moral approach, the economic approach does
not justify protecting privacy for its own sake, but rather because privacy
often enhances social welfare by diminishing avoidance, defensive, and
suboptimal enforcement costs. Economic analysis also suggests, however,
that courts should refuse to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy
when doing so would generate few of these costs, but would significantly
enhance deterrence. Economics and public choice theory can also reduce
decision-making error by identifying the circumstances in which courts
should be especially deferential to legislative choice, such as where a search
technology is novel, technically complex, and undergoing rapid change, and
its costs are borne by a broad swath of the population.
By these standards, infrared searches do not invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy. They provide police with a powerful investigative
tool, thereby enhancing the deterrence of crime, without producing (to any
significant extent) the costs associated with the avoidance of productive
activity, the prevention of privacy intrusions, the enforcement of inefficient
criminal prohibitions, or the profiling of vulnerable minorities. The
economic approach confirms that the Supreme Court of Canada in Tessling
(and not the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Kyllo) correctly
concluded that warrantless infrared searches are constitutional. It also
suggests that courts should defer to legislatures in deciding whether and
how to regulate future, potentially more intrusive infrared technologies, so
long as these technologies do not disproportionately harm minorities.
The case for recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in
relation to GPS and wireless telephone tracking is much stronger. The
privacy costs associated with these technologies are substantially greater
than for infrared searches. Location tracking has the potential to produce
substantial avoidance and defensive costs. It may also increase the risk of
discriminatory profiling. In addition, the case for legislative deference is
weaker for GPS and wireless telephone tracking than for infrared searches.
The complexity and rapid development of tracking technologies militate in
favor of legislative regulation, but legislatures are unlikely to fully account
for disproportionate impacts on minority suspects. The best solution may
therefore be for courts to recognize a minimal expectation of privacy that
would require warrants based on reasonable suspicion. This would provide
considerable protection against discriminatory profiling without usurping
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the legislature's capacity to determine the need for more extensive
regulation.
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